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I. INTRODUCTION
Mostpeople acknowledge the need to protect the environment. The questionis how
best to accomplish this task. Many forms of pollution are not contained by national
borders but rather go where the wind carries them, sometimes literally. There is no
doubt that many of the most serious environmental threats facing the planet-such
as global warming,' the hole in the ozone layer,2 and the depletion ofspecies from the
t Copyright 2001 by John A. Barrett, Jr.
* Associate Professor ofLaw, UniversityofToledo College ofLaw. B.A., 1985, Amherst
College; J.D., 1988, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank his colleagues David
Harris, William Richman, Daniel Steinbock, Bruce Kennedy, Sandi Zellmer, and Kris
Niedringhaus for their invaluable assistance and comments and Michael Grendzynski for his
assistance with research. This Article was written with support from a University of Toledo
summer research grant.
1. See Kevin R. Gray, International Environmental Impact Assessment: Potential for a
Multilateral EnvironmentalAgreement, I 1 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 83, 95 (2000);
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world's oceans3 -areproblems that will not be solvedby any one nation alone. Sadly,
in spite of the encouraging growth in the number of international environmental
treaties over the last twenty-five years,4 there remains little true protection for the
environment at the international level.
Many of these treaties' provisions are hortatory rather than obligatory; many of
their provisions are vague and impose no concrete commitments.5 Furthermore, even
ifa treaty creates a serious duty to protect the global environment, nations can choose
not to join, allowing these holdout nations to diminish the treaty's potential gains.6
Thus, although international environmental treaties are clearly a step in the right
direction, they have so far provided scant protection against the potentially
devastating environmental consequences facing the world.
Additionally, the environmental regulations of the nations most committed to
reducing pollution, including the United States, may be in need of improvement.
After approximately forty years of modem environmental regulation, the record of
the United States has been mixed.7 There is no doubt that the rate of environmental
contamination has slowed.8 Unfortunately, with increases in the size of the
population,9 increases in industrialization, and continuous advances in technology
that permit more rapid exploitation of natural resources and use of previously
inaccessible resources, the internal threat to the domestic environment remains a
major concern. This raises the question of whether the "command-and-control"
approach to environmental regulation that the United States has historically
embraced'0 is the best approach to protecting the environment or whether the United
States should shift to an approach based on economic incentives, as experts have
John Wickham, Toward a Green MultilateralInvestment Framework: NAFTA and the Search
for Models, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REv. 617, 643 (2000).
2. Gray, supra note 1, at 95; Wickham, supra note 1, at 643.
3. Wickham, supra note 1, at 643.
4. Gray, supra note I, at 83. See Ryan L. Winter, Reconciling the GATT and WTO with
MultilateralAgreements: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?, 11 CoLO. J. INT'LENVTL
L. & POL'Y 223, 229 (2000).
5. See Matthew Brotmann, The Clash Between the WTO and the ESA: Drowninga Turtle
to Eat a Shrimp, 16 PACE ENVTL L. REv. 321,325 (1999); David A. Wirth, The International
Trade Regime and the Municipal Law ofFederal States: How Close a Fit?, 49 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1389, 1389-91 (1992).
6. Wirth, supra note 5, at 1390.
7. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders ofU.S. EnvironmentalLaw:
Origins and Morphology, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1994). See generally FRANK P.
GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.01 (2000) (discussing the history of
environmental law in the United States).
8. See Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T The Convergent Evolution of
EnvironmentalLaw, 63 MIsS.L.J. 403,418 (1994); SidneyA. Shapiro &Thomas 0. McGarity,
Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729,
746 n.96.
9. See Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future ofEnvironmental Policy,
1997 U. Co. LEGALF. 159, 183-84 (1997).
10. Hoong N. Young, An Analysis of a Global Emissions-Trading Program, 14 J. LAND
USE& ENVTL L. 125, 128 (1998).
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suggested."
A new approach to domestic environmental law can address both concerns. If the
United States were to move to a regulatory regime that taxes the pollution created in
connection with manufacturing products, the tax would create economic incentives
for pollution control in the production process. More importantly, the tax could be
imposed on products that are imported into the United States, thereby giving foreign
manufacturers a motivation to decrease their own pollution emissions.
Any attempt to protect the global environment through the extraterritorial effects
of a unilateral action, however, must be considered in light of another body of law:
free trade agreements. These agreements have helped fuel the economic prosperity
that the world has seen at the end of the twentieth century.'2 Their major premise is
that by removing trade barriers, consumers will benefit from the comparative
advantages that different nations have in producing goods.'3 Those nations that have
a resource, technological, labor, or other type of advantage will be able to produce a
better product at a lower cost to the consumer if artificial barriers protecting domestic
producers are removed.' 4 Unfortunately, one of the competitive advantages a nation
might have in producing a product more cheaply is the absence of costly
environmental regulations.' 5 Thus, the environmental community has increasingly
become concerned that free trade arrangements, as currently pursued, are often
detrimental to the environment.'6
This viewpoint has been strengthened by several major international disputes 7
11. See DAVID M. ROODMAN, THE NATURAL WEALTH OF NATIONS: HARNESSING THE
MARKET FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (Linda Starke ed., 1998); Jonathon R. Nash, Too Much
Market? Conflict Between TradableAllowances and the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 465 (2000); Young, supra note 10, at 128-39.
12. See David A. Gantz, Failed Efforts to Initiate the "Millennium Round" in Seattle:
Lessons for Future Global Trade Negotiations, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 349, 349-50
(2000); Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics ofSeattle, 17 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COMp. L. 257, 271-73 (2000).
13. See Nathalie Chalifour, Global Trade Rules and the World's Forests: Taking Stock of
the World Trade Organization's Implicationsfor Forests, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REV. 575,
583 (2000); Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade System: Multilateral
Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB.
175, 177 (1996); John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental -Policies:
Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. &LEEL. REv. 1227, 1231 (1992); Tiefenbrun, supra note
12, at 260-67; Winter, supra note 4, at 227-28.
14. See Jackson, supra note 13, at 1231; Winter, supra note 4, at 227-28.
15. See Hudnall, supra note 13, at 178-79; Jackson, supra note 13, at 1231.
16. DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 52-
53 (1994); RICHARDA. WESTIN,ENViRONMENTALTAXINTIATiVEANDMULTLATERALTRADE
AGREEMENTS: DANGEROUS COLLISIONS (1997); Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 273-74; Winter,
supra note 4, at 245.
17. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), http:l/www.wto.org/english/
tratope/dispu._e58abr.pdf [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle]; WTO Appellate Body Report on
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/9 (May 20,
1996), 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996) [hereinafterReformulated Gasoline]; GATI'Dispute Panel Report
on United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (May 20, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 839
2001]
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resolved pursuant to the rules of the world's most significant free trade agreement,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 8 as amended through a series of
successive rounds culminating in its current incarnation as the World Trade
Organization. 9 GATT/WTO dispute-resolution panels' have consistently held that
various domestic environmental laws impermissibly interfered with free trade
obligations." In response, segments of the environmental community have called for
both a decreased commitment to free trade2' and reforms to free trade agreements to
make them more responsive to legitimate environmental concerns and objectives.'
The call for change reached its most fevered cry in December of 1999, when
environmental protests culminated in rioting at the WTO conference in Seattle?'
Even the WTO has increasingly become aware of the need to include
environmental issues in subsequent rounds of negotiation. In 1994, the WTO
established the Committee on Environment and Trade to consider trade and
environmental issues.2" Additionally, during talks held over the last year concerning
the agenda for subsequent rounds of GATT/WTO negotiations, the United States has
lobbied to have environmental issues included as a topic for negotiation, though the
(1994) [hereinafter Dolphin-Tuna II]; GATT Dispute Panel Report on United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155
(1993) [hereinafter Dolphin-Tuna 1]; WESTIN, supra note 16, at 10-12.
18. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT 1947].
19. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IA, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTSOFTHEURUGUAYROUND vol. 1, 33 l.L.M. 1154 (1994). For purposes
of this Article, references to the agreement and actions taken pursuant to it shall be collectively
referred to as "GATT/WTO" except when referring to the World Trade Organization as an
entity, which shall be referred to as the "WTO," or when referring to dispute-resolution
decisions rendered under the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade prior
to the creation of the WTO, which shall be referenced as being made by "GATT." See
generally Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 260-67 (discussing the history of the GATI/WTO).
20. To date only one GATT/WTO dispute concerning environmental protections has come
close to being upheld under GATr/WTO's environmental exceptions. Winter, supra note 4,
at 224 n.4; RitaM. Wisthoff-Ito, The United States and Shrimp Import Prohibitions: Refusing
to SurrendertheAmerican Goliath Role in Conservation, 23 MD. J. INT'LL. &TRADE 247,274
(1999). See generally Andres Rueda, Tuna, Dolphins, Shrimp and Turtles, What About
Environmental Embargoes Under NAFTA?, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 647 (2000).
21. Rueda, supra note 20, at 650; Winter, supra note 4, at 245.
22. See Gantz, supra note 12, at 355-57; Pacts Should Address Environment to Boost
Public Confidence, NWF Says, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 55 (Jan. 13, 2000).
23. Sam H. Verhovek & Steven Greenhouse, National Guard Is Called to Quell Trade-
Talk Protests: Seattle ls Under CurfewAfter Disruptions, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1999, atAl; see
Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 257-58; see also Chalifour, supra note 13, at 576; Gantz, supra
note 12 (discussing what went wrong at the Millennium Round in Seattle).
24. Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 278; Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at 284; see also Winter,
supra note 4, at 239. See generally Carrie Wofford, A Greener Future at the WTO: The
Refinement of WTO Jurisprudence on Environmental Exceptions to GAM, 24 HARV. ENVTL
L. REV. 563 (2000) (discussing increasing acceptability of environmental issues in WTO
jurisprudence).
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attempt has thus far been unsuccessful.' While making free trade agreements more
environmentally friendly is no doubt one part of the optimal long-term solution to this
tension, such changes seem nnlikely in the near future, given the length of time it has
traditionally taken to negotiate a new "round" of GATr/WTO amendments. 6
Given that a workable integration of free trade law and international environmental
law remains a distant hope, the vital issue in considering a domestic pollution tax is
whether it could be applied to imported products without violating GATT/WTO. If
a pollution tax can be applied in compliance with GATT/WTO, it will represent a
major advance in the protection of the planet during an era of weak international law
while also providing the benefits of an economic-incentive approach to domestic
environmental regulation.
This Article will begin by first discussing problems inherent in the command-and-
control approach that the United States has taken to protect the environment and then
contrasting it with the two major economic-incentive approaches that have been
suggested as possible alternatives: emissions trading and pollution taxes. Second, this
Article will review the weaknesses of the current international environmental treaty
regime with regard to protecting the environment. Third, the Article will consider the
tension and conflict between free trade and environmental protection. Finally, the
Article will examine a proposed pollution tax and argue that it can protect the global
commons in ways other domestic environmental laws do not and that it complies with
the rules of GATr/WTO.
II. THE NEED FOR A NEW DOMESTIC APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. The Command-and-Control Approach
In recent years, an increasing number of commentators have suggested that
American environmental law should shift away from the traditional command-and-
control approach and toward a market-based-incentive approach.' However, the
25. See U.S. Outlines Priorities for Environment at Upcoming Round of Global Trade
Talks, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 456 (Mar. 17, 1999).
26. Although at this time it is unclear when the next round of GAT negotiations will be
held, recent rounds have taken five to seven years to complete (Kennedy Round-1962-67,
Tokyo Round-1 973-79, Uruguay Round-1 986-93). Carol J. Miller & Jennifer L. Croston,
WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental Objectives: Assessment of the International Dolphin
Conservation Program Act, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 73, 78 (1999); see also Gantz, supra note 12, at
357-59 (evaluating the potential for a new negotiating round); Effort to Revive WTO Round
Must Start Before U.S. Elections Complete, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2057 (Dec. 23, 1999);
U.S., EUAgree to Work Toward New Round of WTO Trade Talks but Differences Remain, 16
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2055 (Dec. 23,1999); U.S.-EUStatement on the WTO, Released Dec.
17, 1999, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2096 (Dec. 23, 1999) (discussing the need for a new
round of negotiations).
27. See ROODMAN, supra note 11; Robert W. McGee& WalterE. Block, Pollution Trading
Permits as a Form of Market Socialism and the Search for a Real Market Solution to
Environmental Pollution, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 51 (1994); Symposium, Free Market
Environmentalism: The Role ofthe Market in En vironmentalProtection, 15 HARV.J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 297 (1992). But see Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-
20011
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command-and-control approach has been the foundation of modem U.S.
environmental law, which began in the 1960s and 1970s with the enactment of most
of the major environmental laws that are in effect today.28
Under the command-and-control approach, the government studies aparticular area
of environmental concern, such as air or water pollution. Based on this examination,
it mandates--either directly or indirectly-a course of action to be undertaken by
polluting industries in order to obtain a maximum acceptable level of pollution that
protects human health-among other things." The regulations may take different
forms, but they typically mandate a total level of pollution not to be exceeded in an
area, a standard of technology to be utilized byparticular industries, or a combination
thereof"0 When technology standards are designated, they may require the use of a
particular technology or may set mandatory design or performance specifications.
Most experts agree that this approach has been a good start to combating increases
in environmental contamination.3 Although regions have frequently failed to attain
Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative
Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 5 Wis. L. REv. 887 (1999). It must be
noted, however, that not all types ofenvironmental regulation are necessarily well suited to the
market-incentive approaches discussed herein. Tradable emissions allowances and taxes on
pollutants emitted are well suited to regulating pollution discharges and to minimizing the
creation of new contamination. However, such approaches are ill suited, at least in the form
described in this Article, to remedying environmental problems that already exist. The
appropriateness ofmodifying U.S. environmental regulations that cover matters other than the
emission of new pollutants and the form such modifications might take are, therefore, outside
the scope of this Article.
28. Percival, supra note 9, at 164-67; Young, supra note 10, at 128. SeegenerallyRodgers,
supra note 7 (reviewing the origins and features of seven major U.S. environmental laws).
29. See, e.g., Clean Water Act §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998); Clean Air Act §§ 109-371,42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
30. For example, the Clean Air Act ("CAA") primarily takes a maximum-concentration
approach (known as setting an ambient standard), and the Clean Water Act ("CWA")
emphasizes a technology approach. Under the CAA, a maximum level of concentration for
certain pollutants, known as the National Ambient Air Quality Standard ("NAAQS"), has been
set. See Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994). The government commands that the
NAAQS be met for all regions of the United States. Id. Of course, some regions are cleaner
than others. Regions not in compliance must develop plans, known as State Implementation
Plans ("SIPs"), for how theywill come into compliance. Id. § 107,42 U.S.C. § 7407. Themost
contaminated regions have the most stringent requirements, while cleaner regions generally
have greater latitude to contaminate their air. See id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410. The general
mandate to meet the NAAQS may be furthered by requiring various industries in a SIP to use
specific technologies. See id. Additionally, the CAA mandates specific technologies for new
major sources of air pollution. See id. § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411. On the other hand, the CWA
mandates the use of the best available technology for a particular industry. Clean Water Act §
301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(1)(A)(i) (1994). This standard is then taken into account in setting
the discharge levels permitted for each polluter. Id. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. These
technological requirements are supplemented by water-quality standards that vary depending
upon the use to which the water is put. See id. § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
31. See Houck, supra note 8, at 460-62; Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic
Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,528, 10,541-42
(Sept. 1991); Percival, supra note 9, at 176. See generally ROODMAN, supra note 11
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the mandated standards by their respective deadlines, 2 there is little doubt that U.S.
air and water are much cleaner than they would be but for these rules. In many
instances, the air and water are actually cleaner than they were twenty years ago,33
and even in instances where pollution has not abated, the considerable growth in
population and the size of the U.S. economy mayhave offset the decreased emission
levels on a per capita basis.34
B. Problems with the Command-and-Control Approach
Although environmental command-and-control regulation did a good job as an
initial mechanism to help the United States improve its environmental situation, it has
a number of limitations and disadvantages that have become increasingly apparent
and are resulting in calls for a different approach.3"
At a basic level, the notion of setting a safe air- or water-quality standard is
questionable. Any scientist will confirm that for many pollutants there really is no
such thing as a safe level; rather, any given level presents a certain risk of various
adverse health effects.36 For example, a certain amount of a pollutant in the air may
result in a one-in-one-million chance of causing cancer and a one-in-one-thousand
chance of increasing the difficulty of breathing for asthmatics. Decreasing the level
(discussing the problems with the current regulatory approach and potential market-based
solutions).
32. For example, the CWA set a goal "to eliminate the discharge of all pollutants into the
water by 1985 [and] to make all of the Nation's water safe for swimming... and wildlife by
1983." Lisa E. Roberts, Note, Is the Gun Loaded this Time? EPA 's Proposed Revisions to the
Total Maximum Daily Load Program, 6 ENvTL LAW. 635, 640 (2000) (summarizing Clean
Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I)-(2) (1994)). Both of these attempts failed. See id. at
645.
33. See Democrats Take CreditforEight Years of "the Cleanest Environment in Decades",
31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1726 (Aug. 18,2000).
34. See COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALrTY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE TWENTIETH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COuNcIL ON ENvIRONMENTAL QUALITY TOGETHER WITH THE
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS 7-10 (1990).
35. Considerable scholarship has debated command-and-control and market-incentive
approaches. For a more thorough treatment ofthe issues presented by this debate, see generally
ROODMAN, supra note 11; Cole & Grossman, supra note 27; David M. Driesen, Is Emissions
Tradingan Economic-Incentive Program?: Replacingthe Command-and-Control/Economic-
Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 289, 295-322 (1998); Houck, supra note 8;
Nash, supra note 11; Percival, supra note 9; Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental
Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENvTL L. 153 (1988) [hereinafter Stewart,
Controlling Risks]; Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing
Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585 (1996) [hereinafter Stewart, FallingParadigm]; Symposium,
supra note 27; T.H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, in
ECONOMIC PoLIcY TOWARDS THE ENVIRONMENT 86 (Dieter Helm ed., 1991); Young, supra
note 10, at 128-31.
36. See Am. Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that
there appears to be no safe threshold for ground-level ozone); Alistar M. Hanna, Seminar on
the Law of Sustainable Development-United States: The Land Use System, 13 PACE ENVTL.
L. REv. 531, 536 (1996).
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may drop the chance of cancer to one in ten million or even to one in one hundred
million, but it does not make the air absolutely safe, just safer. In other words, some
people will still be harmed at virtually any level that is chosen. Thus, an ambient
standard does not represent a healthy environment but rather represents the level of
risk that the government will tolerate.37
Adding to this difficulty is the fact that knowledge of the risks posed by any given
pollutant continuallychanges overtime as scientific research progresses.3 In the forty
years of modem environmental law, levels of pollutants that were once thought to be
relatively safe have been shown repeatedly to represent a higher risk than previously
thought?9
Ambient standards not onlypresent these difficulties based on scientific uncertainty
but also lead to the allocation of time and money for quantifying the risk and for
setting an acceptable level of risk.' The question, therefore, is whether the time and
effort spent obtaining this information helps create the most efficient result: the least-
polluted environment that can reasonably be obtained. In other words, given that
pollution is anecessarybyproduct ofmodem industrial life, itis questionable whether
it is worth the time and effort necessary to determine the health risks at various levels
ofevery pollutant and the acceptable level of risk, particularly ifdetermining the level
of risk is almost certainly incorrect. Such action becomes a fool's errand if there is
an alternative mechanism that will result in a continual reduction of the pollution-
discharge levels. After all, once it becomes clear that for most contaminants any level
of emission poses a danger, the ultimate goal of environmental law should be, in a
broad sense, the reduction of all emissions to a level as close to zero as possible.
Two additional obvious and closely related disadvantages of the command-and-
control approach derive from the inherent limitations of any regulatory regime that
specifies a particular technology to reach its goal. By the time the government has
determined the appropriate specification or technology, the pollution-control industry
has frequently moved on to a better technology or an equivalent one that is cheaper
to install and operate.4 ' Thus, the government is constantly expending resources
37. SeeAm. TruckingAss n, 175 F.3d at 1034-40; National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for Ozone, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,716, 65,727 (proposed Dec. 13, 1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §
50.9-. 10 (2001)); Victor B. Flatt, SavingtheLost Sheep: BringingEnvironmental Values Back
into the Fold with a New EPA Decisionmaking Paradigm, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1, 4-14 (1999).
38. See Flatt, supra note 37, at 4-14; Hanna, supra note 36, at 535-38.
39. See Lead Indus. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Flatt, supra note 37,
at 4-14.
40. See Stewart, Falling Paradigm, supra note 35, at 587-91. In fact, the CAA mandates
reviewing standards on a five-year basis. Clean Air Act § 109(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (1994).
Although this disadvantage does not exist when a specific technology is mandated without any
reference to an ambient standard, a similar set of costs is associated with determining the
appropriate technology for every industry and for setting permissible levels of discharge based
thereon. See infra note 41.
41. See Stewart, Falling Paradigm, supra note 35, at 587-9 1. Recognizing this problem,
the CWA requires a review of standards every five years. Clean Water Act § 301 (d), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). It should be noted that the CWA does not mandate a
particular technology under its requirement that industries use the best available technology
("BAT"). The Environmental Protection Agency makes a determination ofwhat the BAT is for
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refining its standards while virtually always remaining several steps behind current
developments.42 Furthermore, the standards are more stringent for new plants and
modifications of old plants.43 A factory that is more than a few years old will almost
always be using outdated environmental technology because there is no government
compulsion or business incentive to expend the money necessary to update the
technology. Additionally, since a plant modification often triggers the need to update
environmental control devices, polluters may actually have an incentive to postpone
modifications that would make a plant more energy efficient due to the costs that the
new technology would entail."'
A final disadvantage concerns the potential effects of command-and-control
regulation on competition between businesses. By setting ambient health-related
standards for clean air, the U.S. government immediately characterized some regions
as compliant and others as noncompliant for any given pollutant. As a result, new
businesses in regions that are in compliance are often allowed to use cheaper, less
effective environmental technologies than new businesses in regions that are not in
compliance. Obviously, this situation creates a competitive advantage for businesses
in a cleaner area. Perhaps this is appropriate since it creates an incentive to place
businesses in areas that can more safely handle the environmental contamination.
However, a better regime would encourage all businesses to use the best
commercially feasible technology available. After all, if virtually any level of
emission for most pollutants poses some risk, why should we ever accept a lesser
environmental technology if a better one is economically feasible?
Unfortunately, there is an even greater negative effect on competition. Regions that
are in compliance are perceived as having room forpollution since they are below the
ambient air standards; furthermore, new business can come into the area relatively
freely. However, new sources of pollution are not allowed in nonattainment regions
unless there is a corresponding (and larger) decrease from another source in the
area.!' Although this makes sense if one perceives the ambient air standards as clear
a particular industry and uses this to establish effluent limitations for the industry. See id. §§
301,304, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314. Each company can utilize whatever technology it desires
to meet this limitation. See id. However, the costs associated with determining all the BATs and
adjusting them on an ongoing basis are essentially the same as if a particular technology were
mandated.
42. See StewartFallingParadigm, supra note 35, at 587-91. The onlyway to avoid these
costs is to let the standards stagnate and become outdated, thereby allowing additional harm
to the environment. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
RulemakingProcess, 41 DUKEL.J. 1385,1387-96 (1992). Thishasbecome agrowing concern
of some critics of current U.S. environmental law. See id.
43. See Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1994).
44. See Stewart, ControlingRisks, supra note 35, at 158. But see Houck, supra note 8, at
429-30 (noting that requirements for alternative technology, including even outright bans of
harmful substances such as leaded gasoline and DDT, can force industry to find alternative
means of production or alternative, less destructive products and, in doing so, save money as
well); Percival, supra note 9, at 179 (claiming that industrial responses to government
regulation show that the most important factor affecting technological innovation is the
stringency of the regulation).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
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demarcations of the level of air quality necessary to protect health," it has the effect
of freezing out new competition in the region. No one can enter the region unless
someone else is willing to pollute less. Any new competitor must essentially buy part
of a present business's pollution stream if it wants to set up in the nonattainment
area-a cost not borne by those already in business in the area. In fact, the business
selling the pollution offset not only escapes such costs but also gets the windfall of
being paid, part of which almost certainly will be profit. Although this is not a major
issue for manufacturing operations, 7 this freezeout/payoff could severely limit new
competition in service-related industries.
C. Market-Based Proposals
Given the limitations of command-and-control regulation, experts have increasingly
called for a new form of environmental regulation: one based on market incentives."
In order to understand this approach, one must understand why companies pollute at
the levels they do and what, other than a government mandate, would cause them to
pollute less.
Economists have developed a theory to explain why environmental regulation, in
some form, will almost always be a necessity of the industrialized world. Since no
one owns the air or water that gets polluted, such commodities are essentially
commons: commodities available for use and overuse by all. This situation has
traditionally been described as the tragedy of the commons."9 When someone can use
a resource without paying for its full value, there is a tendency to use more than is
economically efficient, since the person is not bearing the full cost of the use.5° For
example, a polluter often contaminates not only his own air but also the air that the
rest of us use, since air pollution is usually not confined to a particular person's
property. The emitter is not left with his own extremely polluted air nor are his
neighbors with their clean air. Rather, everyone is left with somewhat polluted air. In
other words, the polluter does not bear the full cost ofpolluting; we all bear a portion
of the cost. Thus, if contamination beyond a specific level is intolerable to a polluter,
his air will not reach the level at which he will do something about it until his total
emissions are far beyond what would be necessary to reach the same level if all his
discharges were confined to his property. As a result, a polluter emits more
46. But see note 36 and accompanying text.
47. Manufacturing operations can presumably locate in cleaner areas and ship into
nonattainment areas.
48. This too has generated considerable analysis to date. For a more detailed view of the
issues presented in trying to decide between economic-incentive approaches, see generally
ROODMAN, supra note 11; Frank S. Arnold, The Economist's Perspective: Why There Are No
Pollution Taxes, ENvTL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 14; Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano,
Emissions Trading: Whyls this Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 217 (1988);
McGee & Block, supra note 27; Nash, supra note 11; Symposium, supra note 27; Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L.
241, 242-46 (2000); Young, supra note 10, at 128-31.
49. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
50. Id. at 1244-45; see also WESTIN, supra note 16, at 43-52; Jackson, supra note 13, at
1231; Young, supra note 10, at 129.
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contaminants than he would emit if he alone had to bear all the consequences of this
action. In other words, the costs of polluting are an externality.
A business pays for its labor, its raw materials, and its factory, but it does not pay
for the amount of pollution it creates, even though the pollution consumes a resource
just as the plant consumes (but pays for) the resource of energy. When a business
does not have to pay for using a resource, it has little incentive to use the resource in
a frugal manner.
Clearly, many environmental resources-such as air, many types of water bodies,
and fish stocks-are classic examples of commons, since they are not owned by
anyone in particular. Everyone can use them, so polluting them is merely an
externality for a business.5 ' If the tragedy of the commons is the likely fate for any
commons in a crowded world with multiple demands upon limited resources, then
some governmental action is required to avert the destruction of the environment. The
command-and-control approach is one possible form of action. However, the lesson
to be drawn from the tragedy of the commons and from the realization that pollution
is an externality is that other approaches will encourage businesses to pollute at lower
levels, possibly even lower than the command-and-control approach will yield. The
key to getting businesses to pollute less (other than by a direct regulation) is to make
each business bear, as nearly as possible, the full cost of the resources it consumes. 2
With a price attached to pollution, the externality becomes an internality, and a
company has the incentive to lessen this cost to the maximum degree economically
feasible.5 3
1. The Emissions Trading Approach
In a classic commons situation, an externalitycanbe internalized by privatizing the
commons.' A user entitled to only a portion of the commons will not destroy that
portion by overutilizing or contaminating the resource. To do otherwise would
essentially be to destroy one's own property. Even if one has little use for the
property, someone else may have greater use for it, so it could be sold if preserved.
Of course, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to privatize ownership of a certain
amount of clean air or water in the ocean or of migratory birds or fish. These
resources, by their very nature, move in such a way as to make ownership difficult.
However, ownership can be approximated by giving each eligible party a right to
pollute only at a certain level. If everyone owns the right to emit pollutants at a fixed
amount per year, there would be a commodity with a value. Those who discharge less
could sell their remaining right to pollute to those who need to emit more than their
allotment. More importantly, this mechanism gives everyone a continuing incentive
to pollute less and to develop and utilize new environmental protection technology.
5 1. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and Three Economies: Navigating a
Sprawling Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in Which Everything Is
Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARV. ENVTL L. REv. 359, 366, 374-78, 379-82 (1999)
(discussing historic failure of market economics to address environmental problems).
52. HectorRogelio Tortes, The Trade and Environment Interaction in the WTO: How Can
a "New Round" Contribute?, J. WOR.D TRADE, Oct. 1999, at 153, 154.
53. Nash, supra note 11, at 479.
54. Thompson, supra note 48, at 243-44.
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For those already discharging less than their rights permit, any further decreases
would produce a salable good, while for those polluting more than their rights permit,
any decreases would mean that they need to buy less of the unused rights of others.
Thus, one increasingly popular alternative is to create tradable permits to pollute 5
55. To date, there are few emissions trading programs. One program that has had
considerable success, albeit on a limited scope, is the United States's sulfur dioxide (SO2)
permit trading program for electricity-generating facilities. This program was created to deal
with high levels of SO2 generated by coal-fired utilities, particularly when using coal with high
sulfur content from the eastern United States. Since its creation by the 1990 amendments to the
CAA, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2468 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), this program has significantly lowered total SO 2
emissions. Equally important, the cost ofbuying permit rights has been considerably lower than
expected. Although depressed prices for low sulfur content of western coal partly explain this
lower cost, it is also attributable to the rapid advancement of emission-control technology and
the lower-than-anticipated cost of installing and operating it. Advocates of emissions permit
trading point to this program as evidence that when industry has an ongoing incentive to
develop and utilize pollution-reduction technology, the results can be surprisingly successful.
See Nicole Fradette et al., Project: Regulatory Reform: A Survey ofthe Impact ofReregulation
and Deregulation on Selected Industries and Sectors, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 469, 483 (1995);
Nash, supra note 11, at 487-93. Cf. Young, supra note 10, at 136-39.
Due in part to the success of the S02 program, a similar mechanism is in the process of
being implemented for nitrogen oxides as well. Young, supra note 10, at 492-93. For a general
description and critique of this program, see Jamie Larmann, Comparing Apples to Oranges?
EPA Faces Dirculties in Bringing to Fruition an Emissions-Trading Program for NOX, 6
ENVTL LAW. 603 (2000).
On the international front, the Kyoto Protocol, if it becomes effective, will require signatory
nations to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases to each nation's 1990 levels by 2005.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10,
1997,37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. One of the mechanisms by which proponents
hope this reduction will be achieved is having nations with excess emissions trade more for the
right to pollute with signatory nations who exceed the mandated reduction. See Gray E. Taylor,
Global Climate Change Agreements-Do the Storm Clouds Have a Silver Lining?, 45 ROCKY
MTN. MiN. L. INsT. 2-1, § 2.03 (1999); Nash, supra note 11, at 493-96. It must be noted,
however, that this type of international trading regime is far different from a domestic
emissions trading regime, such as the S02 regime in the United States. Both regimes give an
economic incentive to the participant to try to reduce pollution (so fewer permits must be
acquired or so that one has permits to sell). But in a domestic trading regime, like industry in
the program has economic incentives to reduce pollution. Conversely, in the international
regime, the nation still has domestic authority over how it will pursue the incentive created by
the trading regime. Although it is possible that a nation will choose to create parallel trading
programs within its borders to help the nation benefit under the international program, it is at
least equally likely (based on most nations' pollution-control programs to date) that the nation
will meet its obligations under the international regime by mandating certain compliance
standards for its industries using traditional command-and-control approaches. Obviously, such
an approach would not have the economic-incentive effects for the polluters themselves that
a domestic emissions trading program would have. However, in order to obtain the reductions
required by the Kyoto Protocol, Germany is considering an internal emissions trading program
as well. Climate Change: Germany to Work on Emission Trading Plan with Help from
Industry, Stock Exchange, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1565 (July 28, 2000) [hereinafter German
Plan].
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Requiring businesses to purchase the right to pollute causes each company subject to
the program to choose the most cost-effective approach, thereby promoting the
efficient utilization of resources. Given their desire to minimize costs, businesses
would likely continue to install cutting-edge pollution-control devices so long as the
costs of such devices are either less than the costs of buying permits from others 6 or
less than the amount obtainable by selling anypermits no longer needed once superior
technology is installedY Furthermore, those interested in protecting the environment
to an even greater degree can do so by purchasing permits and then choosing not to
utilize them. 8
Of course, the relative need that an industry has for permits and the general
availability of permits will dramatically affect their price. If too many permits are
available, the law of supply and demand says the price of the permits will drop, and
as the price drops, industry has less incentive to install additional pollution-control
devices. 9 Thus, the first difficulty of a permit trading regime is that it must make sure
there is not an overabundance of permits, or else the entire regime will not create the
incentive necessary to encourage less polluting.'
This can be accomplished, in part, by restricting the trading regime to a limited
number of industries and a limited number of pollutants. Since different industries
tend to have difficulty controlling different pollutants, the more pollutants that are
included in a regime, the easier it is for the different industrial sectors to trade away
the right to discharge the substances they have an excess right to emit in exchange for
those they need additional rights to emit, without actually decreasing total discharges.
Similarly, even if only one pollutant is to be traded and the pool of industries
governed by the permit trading regime is too large, many industrial sectors might still
have an excess capacity to pollute (or be able to obtain such capacity cheaply relative
to the costs of pollution-control devices for that industry), thereby creating a cheap
permit availability and a decreased incentive for major emitters diligently to pursue
reduced emissions. Given the need to confine trading regimes to a limited number of
industrial sectors and a limited number of pollutants,6 it is somewhat questionable
whether an international trading regime-the type of program that would really be
necessary to protect the global environment-is even feasible.
Another way to avoid excess permits is to tie the total level of emissions allowed
to the level of discharges made by a particular industry at the time of the trading
56. This is true to the extent that the company must lower its pollution output or acquire
the right to pollute more based on its emission allocation.
57. This situation will occur when the company already emits less than its allocation.
58. This course of action has been pursued by various law school environmental societies
and by certain environmental organizations. See Free-Marketeers Hope to Clean Up Pollution,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1993, at All, 1993 WL 6455151; William Fulton, The Big Green
Bazaar, GOVERNING, June 1996, at 38; Laurie Morse, Price of Polluting Drops in US, FIN.
TiMES, March 30, 1995, at 28, LEXIS, News Library, FINTME File.
59. This is because new devices will be installed only if the price of the device is less than
the price of acquiring permits.
60. See Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 48, at 234-36.
61. Cf id. at 234-36 (describing the incentives created in a pollution credit regime to invest
in more expensive pollution-reduction technology as offsets become more difficult to create).
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regime's inception.62 This creates two potential problems. First and foremost, there
will be an ongoing need to continually reduce the total permit allocation. If this is not
done, as pollution controls installed overtime reduce emissions, the need for permits
will decrease, thereby reducing the trading price for permits; this situation would in
turn lower the incentive to continue to update pollution-control devices. However, if
allocation reductions are implemented too quickly, the business cost of complying
with the law could become prohibitively expensive. Equally important is the
likelihood that if the reductions are too fast, industry is likely to rebel on a political
level by rejecting the permit approach, since steep reductions could result in the need
to install the latest technology continuously. This need would change the regime from
a profit-maximizing choice by involved businesses to a mandated expenditure for
such technology. Thus, in a permit trading regime there will be the expense and
administrative burden of determining and adjusting the total permit allocation.
Second, if permits are allocated based on prior emission patterns,63 any new
enterprise in the industrial sector covered by the permits faces an unfair market-
access barrier to competition that other enterprises in the sector did not face.' The
new enterprise cannot operate unless it can acquire permits from other businesses
subject to the trading regime. Thus, the new enterprise maybe denied lawful access
to the marketplace as a result of the lack of available permits. Admittedly, this seems
unlikely given the expected permit-availability increase resulting from other
companies' reductions, though the increase would depend on how quickly allocations
are reduced. However, even if permits are available, the new marketplace entrant
must make an additional expenditure not faced by its competitors; it must buypermits
to begin polluting, whereas established businesses were granted a certain level of
cost-free emission based on prior activities. Adding insult to injury, an established
business can generate additional revenue for itself by selling a portion of the permits
allocated to it. In other words, a new business may have to pay its competitors to
obtain the legal right to compete. Although this may not prevent competition coming
from new entities, it certainly places them at a disadvantage.
Another complaint sometimes lodged against pollution-permit trading regimes is
that by issuing permits, the government is essentially licensingpeople to pollute. This
disturbs some people's sense that pollution is a wrongful act and as such should not
be sanctioned as a permissible activity that one has the right to pursue by license.65
Compounding this "moral" unacceptability is the fact that the very nature of the
economic-incentive-based trading regime means that virtually all of the allocation
granted by the permits will be used. Put another way, if there are excess permits, their
price will drop until they reach a price at which it is cheaper for a business to buy the
permits than to install additional pollution controls. However, if emissions are
decreasing faster and more efficiently under a trading regime than under traditional
command-and-control approaches, the moral objection seems relatively unimportant
62. For example, when the United States's SO2 program went into effect, permits were
allocated to each company in the program based on the amount of SO2 emitted by the company
in prior years. Nash, supra note 11, at 505.
63. This was the approach used in the SO2 program in the United States. Id.
64. RoODMAN, supra note 11, at 154; Nash, supra note 11, at 505-06.
65. ROODMAN, supra note I1, at 155.
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relative to the environmental gains being achieved.
2. Pollution Taxes
Although the tradable permit approach has become the preferred alternative for
modernizing U.S. environmental law, there is another way to give businesses an
incentive to pollute less by forcing them to internalize the costs of pollution. Any
mechanism that makes a consumer pay as close as possible to the full value of the
resource being consumed causes the internalization of the cost of using that
resource.' There is no way to use resources such as raw materials and energy without
paying for them.67 Unfortunately, industries have historically polluted clean air and
water without paying for their use. Thus, the government must create a mechanism
that forces emitters to pay for (and thereby internalize) the pollution they create. Put
simply, the other way to force the internalization of pollution costs is to tax the
amount of pollution discharged by a business.6
Currently, a number of countries use pollution taxes and tax credits to create
economic incentives to help the environment. These incentives take various forms:
credits for utilizing particular technologies, taxes on the use of certain raw materials
that contribute to environmental contamination, taxes on the use of certain
environmentally unfriendly technologies, taxes on products that do not meet certain
environmental standards when utilized, and taxes on the quantity of a pollutant
discharged.69 Despite the fact that most of these taxes have been hailed as successful,
few pollution taxes have been imposed directly upon businesses' discharges, and no
nation has adopted a comprehensive shift to pollution taxes as the primary mechanism
for protecting the environment
Like a permit trading approach, an emissions tax creates an ongoing economic
incentive to develop and utilize superior pollution-control technology.7 ' Both
similarly legitimize pollution by licensing companies to pollute.' However, unlike
66. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 43-52; see also ROODMAN, supra note 11.
67. Pollution taxes, such as the high gasoline taxes in most of Europe, may also be levied
on such resources, particularly when consumption of them contaminates the environment.
These taxes increase the cost ofuse, thereby discouraging use. Although discussion of this type
of pollution tax is beyond the scope of this Article, for a thorough analysis of various types of
pollution taxes and their potential compatibility with GATIWTO, see generally WESTIN,
supra note k6.
68. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 43-52; Howard Gensler, The Economics ofPollution Taxes,
10 1. NAT. RESoURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 6-12 (1994-95); see also ROODMAN, supra note 11, at
144-66.
69. For an overview of the various types of taxes and the countries that are utilizing them,
see ROODMAN, supra note 11, at 144-66; WESTIN, supra note 16, at 25-42.
70. See generally ROODMAN, supra note 11, at 144-66; WESTIN, supra note 16, at 25-42.
The leaders in the movement toward emissions-based pollution taxes have been Holland,
Denmark, and Sweden, with a few other European nations following suit. However, such taxes
have generally covered only a limited number of pollutants. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 25-42;
see also ROODMAN, supra note 11, at 151-52.
71. Nash, supra note 11, at 528; see also ROODMAN, supra note 11, at 151-52.
72. For discussion of this "moral" complaint against market-based pollution-control
regimes, see ROODMAN, supra note 11, at 155-56; supra Part II.C. 1.
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an emissions trading program, which sets a maximum overall pollution output based
on the number of permits issued, a pollution tax places no inherent limit on the
amount of pollution that will be created. As long as a company is willing to pay the
tax, it can pollute as much as it wants. Although some will object to its concomitant
lack of certainty, this approach nevertheless stresses the importance of setting the tax
at the correct level to create an incentive for businesses to utilize newly developing
environmental protection technologies. Like setting the total level of permissible
pollution in a permit regime, setting the tax rate is the critical component in a
pollution tax regime.73 If the tax is too low, businesses will pay the tax rather than
install more expensive pollution-control devices; but, if the tax is too high, industry,
the economy, and consumers may suffer as products become too expensive to be
commercially viable. Likewise, the continual progress of environmental technology
will mean that, over time, a business's emissions tax burden will become so low as
to create little or no incentive to install further pollution-control devices. Thus, just
as the continual need to reduce the total number of permits exists in a trading regime,
the tax rate per unit of a pollutant will need to rise periodically in order to continue
the incentive effect of the pollution tax.' However, the difficulties of setting and
adjusting a pollution tax do not seem more burdensome than repeatedly determining
a "safe" ambient air-quality standard or the proper technology required under a
command-and-control approach, particularly when one considers the benefits of a
market-based-incentive approach generally and those ofapollution tax in particular.75
One of the major advantages of a pollution tax approach compared to an emissions
trading approach is that the tax approach does not create competitive advantages for
established industries. As discussed above, trading regimes create a market-access
barrier, and overcoming this barrier will often result in the entrant having to purchase
its pollution allocation from established competitors, thereby giving those who are
established a financial advantage.76 A tax regime, on the other hand, burdens all
competitors equally. Furthermore, the tax regime generates revenue for the
government, which could be utilized to develop additional pollution-control
technologies or to help remedy existing pollution and hazardous waste problems,
whereas the tradable allowances regime merely generates revenue for certain private
industries at the expense of others.
Both the tradable permit and pollution tax approaches have been proposed as ways
to move beyond the United States's traditional command-and-control approach.7
73. Jonathon Baert Wiener, Global EnvironmentalRegulation: Instrument Choice in Legal
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 728 (1999); cf. Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 8, at 745-48;
Young, supra note 10, at 129. See generally WESTIN, supra note 16, at 54-56; David M.
Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational Context, 27 EcOLOGY L.Q.
1,45 (2000) (explaining avoidance oftaxation schemes through public-choice political theory).
74. ROODMAN, supra note 11, at 157. Additionally, a pollution tax regime could be further
refined by having different tax rates for different industries, so as not to overburden some
industries with the costs of controlling a particular pollutant while underburdening others.
75. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 54-56. Contra Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 8, at 748;
Driesen, supra note 35, at 339-43; Wiener, supra note 73, at 775-77.
76. See supra Part II.C. 1.
77. Wiener, supra note 73, at 679-80.
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Although each alternative has a number of similar benefits, s each has somewhat
different disadvantages, as has been discussed.79 To date, commentators have
weighed in on both sides,' but few have considered the potential international
implications ofmodifying the bulk of America's environmental laws and regulations
to rely on emissions taxes to protect the environment."
Emissions trading affects only those industries included in the regime. Given that
each nation has a sovereign right to mandate its own environmental protection laws
(or lack thereof),82 a trading regime will be effective only for those countries that
voluntarily choose to participate. While creating such a regime would no doubt
improve the global environment, the time and difficulties involved in creating such
a regime-coupled with the virtual certainty that numerous nations wouldnotjoin the
regime-will result in limited protection for the global commons. Although it is
certainly possible in theory for a number of nations to band together to create a
niultilateral permit trading regime in which individual companies could participate,'
78. For example, both internalize the costs ofpolluting, therebypromoting an efficient use
of our natural resources. Also, both create an ongoing economic incentive to continually
develop newer, cheaper, more efficient ways to reduce pollution to maximize profits either (])
by lowering one's taxes or (2) by making it possible to sell more permits or reducing one's
need to buy permits. See supra Part H.C.1.
79. See Young, supra note 10, at 129-30; supra text accompanying notes 59-64, 74, 76;
see also WESTIN, supra note 16, at 52-53.
80. See supra note 48.
81. But see Wiener, supra note 73, at 708; Young, supra note 10, at 129. Cf. Jeffrey C. Fort
& Cynthia A. Faur, Can Emissions Trading Work Beyond a National Program?: Some
Practical Observations on the Available Tools, 18 U. PA. .. INT'L ECON. L. 463 (1997).
Additionally, a number of international-law commentators have analyzed and advocated the
potential use of taxes of various types (including tax rebates for U.S. exports) and embargoes
in international trade to either level the playing field for industries subjected to domestic
environmental regulations or to help better protect the global environment. Robert E. Hudec,
Differences in National Environmental Standards: The Level-Playing-Field Dimension, 5
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1996); Robert E. Hudec, GAYT"Legal Restraints on the Use of
Trade Measures Against Foreign Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND
HARMONIZATION: PREREQTISrrES FOR FREE TRADE? 95 (Jagdish Bhagwati &Robert E. Hudec
eds., 1995); see also WESTIN, supra note 16. Admittedly, global effects are not normally
considered in the context of examining alternative domestic environmental protection regimes.
However, ifcertain approaches can yield global environmental benefits that others cannot, such
benefits must be considered in evaluating policy alternatives. For an overview of the
international limitations of other domestic alternatives, see infra Part V.C.
82. Royal C. Gardner, Exporting American Values: Tenth Amendment Principles and
InternationalEnvironmentalAssistance, 22 HAR. ENvTL L.REV. 1, 26-27 (1998) [hereinafter
Gardner, Exporting American Values]; Royal C. Gardner, Taking the Principle of Just
Compensation Abroad: Private Property Rights, National Sovereignty, and the Cost of
EnvironmentalProtection, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 539,540 (1997) [hereinafter Gardner, National
Sovereignty]; see also Andrew L. Strauss, From GAY7zilla to the Green Giant: Winning the
Environmental Battle for the Soul ofthe World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 769, 783-95 (1998); infra Part V.A.
83. In fact, tradable emissions allowances on a national level are permitted underthe Kyoto
Protocol (if it goes into effect), and at least one nation, Germany, is considering creating an
internal trading regime to help the nation meet its obligations under the protocol. German Plan,
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such a regime seems far off at best, and none of the businesses in countries not
requiring such a permit would be adversely affected by the regime. Furthermore,
given the generally perceived need for emissions trading to limit the number of
pollutants and industries involved, there is some doubt as to the feasibility of creating
an effective global pollution-permit trading system."
A similar complaint could be made about a traditional pollution tax, by which a
company is taxed on all the pollution it produces, since companies outside of the
taxing territory would not be subject to the tax. However, if a nation taxes all goods
by the amount of pollution that was used to produce them, such a tax could be applied
by one country to anyproduct sold inside its borders regardless of where the itemwas
made. This indirect extraterritorial effect would give manufacturers around the globe
an incentive to reduce pollution in order to lessen their tax burdens on exported
goods. Although the incentive on foreign manufacturers would not be as great as that
on domestic manufacturers,85 the United States-as the world's largest
market-could still provide a significant incentive for foreign manufacturers to install
at least the cheaper forms of environmental controls to lower their taxes.86 Provided
such a tax is permissible under GATT/WTO rules,87 the benefits of a pollution tax
regime outweigh those of a tradable permits regime.
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In recent years it has become abundantly clear that pollution is not confined by
national boundaries.88 Given this fact, the environmental policies of virtually every
nation have a potential impact on the environmental well-being of every other nation
as well as on the resources all nations must share, such as the oceans. However, laws
protecting the environment are a relatively modem development, with the United
States leading the way in the 1960s into the era of modem environmental regulation. 9
Although many nations, particularly the more economically developed ones, have
followed suit,' others still either have few environmental laws or do not rigorously
enforce the laws they have.9 ' Additionally, state sovereignty means that each nation
has significant latitude in choosing its environmental policies.92 Compounding this
supra note 55. However, to date there has been no concrete action toward creating an
international emissions trading program in which private industries can participate.
84. See supra Part II.C. 1. But see Wiener, supra note 73; Young, supra note 10.
85. This is because the foreign manufacturer would typically have fewer of its products
subjected to the tax.
86. For further discussion of this incentive effect, see infra Part V.A.
87. Emission taxes on imported products that are part of a consistent, domestic pollution
tax program should be GATT/WTO compliant. See infra Part V.B.
88. Gray, supra note 1, at 95; Hudnall, supra note 13, at 178-79.
89. GRAD, supra note 7, § 1.01, at 1-3; see also Rodgers, supra note 7, at 1009-10.
90. See Gray, supra note 1, at 83-84; Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment
Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91
AMEL J. INT'L L. 231,232-33 (1997).
91. See, e.g., Rueda, supra note 20, at 678-82 (discussing post-NAFTA status of Mexican
environmental law and enforcement programs).
92. Gardner, Exporting American Values, supra note 82, at 26-27; Gardner, National
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problem is the fact that in the modem world of the Internet, global trade, and
multinational corporations, it is relatively easy for manufacturers to move to a nation
with limited environmental regulation-a "pollution haven"--in order to help
minimize the costs of production."
Given the migratory nature of pollution and the sovereign right of nations to set
their own environmental policies, the need for some supranational environmental
protection regime appears relatively clear.94 Currently, of course, there is no
international governing body with the authority to establish an environmental
protection law/policy for all the nations of the world, nor does the creation of such
an entity appear likely in the near future.
One method of helping to protect the global environment is to recognize new
international environmental obligations as part of international law. If certain
minimum environmental standards were required as part of international law, any
nation that did not adhere to the standards could be stigmatized as a violator.
Unfortunately, most international-law standards are relatively vague and difficult to
precisely discern.95 As such, they are not well suited to controlling environmental
contamination, which generally requires complex and detailed regulations.'
Furthermore, even if a nation clearly violated its obligations under international law,
there would be no real enforcement mechanism.97 Clearly, one nation will not invade
another over a failure to abide by international environmental norms,' s and even
Sovereignty, supra note 82, at 540; Rueda, supra note 20, at 667-68 (discussing Shrimp-
Turtle). However, it must be noted that the potentially migratory nature of many forms of
pollution place certain relatively limited constraints on the ability of a nation-pursuant to its
sovereignty power-to disregard environmental contamination completely, since the
sovereignty power is limited by the duty not to do harm to other nations. In other words, if
mobile pollution from one nation will harm another, this situation places a limitation on the
polluting nation's sovereign right to do as it wishes within its own boundaries. However, to
date nations have rarely succeeded in international environmental disputes based upon this
limiting principle. See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with
Preservation ofthe Global Commons: Can We Prosper andProtect?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1407, 1433-48 (1992).
93. Alan R. Jenkins, NAFTA: Is the Environmental Cost ofFree Trade Too High?, 19 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 143, 159-60 (1993). It must be noted, however, that the tendency of
corporations to move to pollution havens to avoid pollution-control costs is highly debatable.
Significant existing evidence suggests that companies relocate or open new facilities based on
potential labor savings, availability of an adequately skilled workforce, and the availability of
necessary resources and infrastructure; although potential environmental savings may be an
added benefit of a new site, it has not been a reason for opening new facilities or relocating.
Rueda, supra note 20, at 668.
94. See William Beardslee, International Law & the Environment: The Need for an
Aggregate Organization, 5 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 379 (1996).
95. Cf. Beardsleesupra note 94, at 384-92; Brotmann, supra note 5, at 345-46 (indicating
difficulties of enforcing international treaties and the ambiguities of interpretation).
96. Cf. Beardslee, supra note 94, at 384-92; Brotmann, supra note 5, at 345-46.
97. See Beardslee, supra note 94, at 386-87.
98. In fact, an armed conflict is likely to worsen environmental contamination. See Robin
L. Juni & Elliot EderEcosystem Management andDamageRecovery in International Conflict,
14 NAT. REsouRcEs & ENV'T 193 (2000).
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economic sanctions may not be permitted due to other international legal
obligations."
Another transnational approach to environmental protection is the use of treaties
that obligate signatories. A treaty will not only bind the signatories but also may form
the basis for customary international law over time."° Thus, it is not surprising that
the number of international environmental treaties has grown tremendously in recent
years i0 and that many international environmental scholars tend to focus on
environmental treaties as the mechanism best suited to protect the global
environment.102
While it seems obvious that additional international environmental treaties will help
improve the global environment and that they may be the best solution to minimizing
contamination of the planet in the long term, this approach has a number of
weaknesses and limitations, particularly in the short term. First, treaties are often
difficult and time consuming to negotiate and draft,0 3 and even after negotiations are
complete, it maybe years before they come into force.'" Given (1) the damage that
has already been done to the planet, (2) the harm that will continue to be done even
if somehow no more pollutants were released, and (3) the level ofnew contamination
that will occur as a reality of modem commerce even if every nation fully committed
itself to protecting the environment tomorrow, time consuming solutions (like
treaties) are not enough by themselves.
Second, a nation is not generally obligated to enter a treaty." Thus, certain nations
may choose not to become parties, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of the treaty
regime. Furthermore, even those parties interested in negotiating and joining a treaty
do so from the perspective of their economic, environmental, and political needs. As
99. A major limitation comes from GATI'/WTO under the concepts of national and most-
favored-nation treatment. See infra Part V.B.1-2.
100. I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONALLAw 39-40 (11 th ed. 1994). However, when
a norm of customary international law is developing, a nation may opt out of its obligations.
Id. at 39. Thus, holdout nations that do not sign a treaty may be equally able to evade the norm
that eventually develops out of the treaty.
101. Gray, supra note 1, at 83; see also Winter, supra note 4, at 230. There are currently
over 200 international environmental treaties and instruments in place. Edith Brown Weiss,
UnderstandingCompliance withInternational EnvironmentalAgreements: TheBaker'sDozen
Myths, 32 U. RIcH. L. REv. 1555,1555 (1999) (citing over 1000 international legal instruments
concerning the environment); see UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, REGISTER OF
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OTHER AGREEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT
(1996).
102. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 1; Michael J. Kelly, Overcoming Obstacles to the Effective
Implementation of International Environmental Agreements, 89 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REV.
447 (1997); Wickhan, supra note 1, at 644; Winter, supra note 4. Admittedly, many of these
scholars wantnot onlymore treaties but also stronger enforcement mechanisms in such treaties.
See Kelly, supra, at 459-62; cf. Sean T. Fox, Responding to Climate Change: The Case for
Unilateral Trade Measures to Protect the Global Atmosphere, 84 GEO. L.J. 2499 (1996).
103. Jennifer A. Bernazani, The Eagle, the Turtle, the Shrimp, and the WTO: Implications
for the Future of Environmental Trade Measures, 15 CONN. J. INT'LL. 207,210-11 (2000).
104. Id.
105. The very notion of a treaty is a voluntary undertaking not otherwise required by
international law.
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a consequence, the compromises that are generally necessary for an effective
environmental treaty acceptable to large number of countries often result in a treaty
with relatively modest goals, requirements, and obligations." Thus, it is not
surprising that most environmental treaties in force today have few true obligations
and are instead filled with hortatory goals, vague and unenforceable standards, and
no real enforcement mechanisms."° Furthermore, like customary international-law
violations, clear treaty violations may even result in no-or very limited-sanctions
for the violator, bothbecause such treaties often lackmeaningfiulpenaltyprovisions °s
and because of the same reasons why customary international law is difficult to
enforce generally. e9
In sum, additional environmental treaties and customary international-
environmental-law norms are probably a major part of the long-term solution to
protecting the global commons. However, in the short term what is needed is an
incentive that can legally have an effect on the environmental practices of businesses
in nations with weak or unenforced environmental laws. A pollution tax of the form
proposed in this Article is just such an incentive.
IV. THE TENSION BETWEEN TRADE LAW AND
INTERNATIONALENVIRONMENTALLAw
Given that the GAIT developed out of the Bretton Woods Conference shortly after
World War II and that public and political concern over the environment has really
been a phenomenon of the last forty years,"' it is hardly surprising that free trade
agreements historically have failed to address environmental issues."' When the
106. Wirth, supra note 5, at 1390; see Fox, supra note 102, at 2505; Todd Sandler &Keith
Sargent, Management of Transnational Commons: Coordination, Publicness, and Treaty
Formation, 71 LAND ECON. 145 (1995). See generally Kelly, supra note 102.
107. See Kelly, supra note 102, at 483-85; Wirth, supra note 5, at 1391-94. However,
several newer treaties have made significant strides toward containing greater enforcement
mechanisms. Cf. Ronald A. Brand, Sustaining the Development of International Trade and
Environmental Law, 21 VT. L. REV. 824, 839-40 (1997).
108. See Kelly, supra note 102, at 483-85; Wirth, supra note 5, at 1391.
109. However, if enforcement is based on a treaty as opposed to mere custom, it may be
easier to discern when a violation has in fact occurred, since a treaty, by being written, has the
potential to create more precisely defined obligations (although most environmental treaties
do not do so at this time).
110. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 5-6; John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round and the Launch
ofthe WTO: Significance & Challenges, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL
TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21sT CENTuRY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 5-7
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996) [hereinafter MULTLATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK]; Amelia
Porges, The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in
MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK, supra, at 65-67; Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 260-67;
Winter, supra note 4, at 227; Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at 249-50.
111. GRAD, supra note 7, § 1.01, at 1-3; see also Brotmann, supra note 5, at 332; Gray,
supra note I, at 83; Rodgers, supra note 7, at 1009-10.
112. For a comprehensive, if somewhat dated, discussion of the potential tensions between
free trade law and environmental protection, see ESTY, supra note 16.
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North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)"' and its environmental side
agreement" 4 were being negotiated, proponents of the treaty hailed the package as the
most environmentally friendly trade agreement in history."5 While this was arguably
true,"16 NAFTA had virtually no competition for this honor since prior trade
agreements had rarely even considered environmental issues in a meaningful way." 7
However, since 1970, the industrialized nations have seen the proliferation of
modem environmental laws within their territories' and the world has seen the
development of numerous environmental treaties." 9 With this rise in laws protecting
the environment has come the potential for conflict between a nation's obligations
under free trade treaties, primarily GATT/WTO, and its domestic environmental laws
or obligations under international environmental treaties. 2 '
At the heart of this controversy is the attempt by free trade agreements to eliminate
barriers to trade. There are essentially three types of trade barriers an imported
product can face. First there are tariffs, taxes imposed on the product as a condition
ofiimportation. 2' Generally speaking, tariffs are the preferred form ofbarrier to trade
since they are readily apparent to anyone trying to engage in trade, are easily
quantified, and changes in them are comparatively easy to negotiate over time. ' Not
surprisingly, the GATT/WTO prefers tariffs to other forms of trade barriers, and as
the GATT/WTO treaty has been modified over the last fifty years, there has been a
regular attempt to convert other types of trade barriers into tariffs.' Additionally,
GATT/WTO has been enormously successful in lowering tariff barriers during
successive rounds of negotiation. 24
The second type of barrier, import quotas, limits the total quantity of a particular
product from a particular country. Thus, a ban on a particular product, from one or
more countries, is essentially an import quota of zero." Import quotas are probably
113. North American Free Trade Agreement, openedforsignature Dec. 8, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
114. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, openedforsignature Sept.
18, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480.
115. Jenkins, supra note 93, at 144; Rueda, supra note 20, at 669-70.
116. Rueda, supra note 20, at 669-70.
117. Id. at 669-70; see also Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment
Debate: In Search of a Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1279,
1289 (1992).
118. Gray, supra note 1, at 84.
119. Id. at 83; see also Winter, supra note 4, at 229-30.
120. See Winter, supra note4, at 223-24. However, to date there has not been a GATIWTO
dispute concerning a multilateral environmental treaty. Id.
121. See Jackson, supra note 13, at 1232.
122. Cf. Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 263-64 (detailing GATT principles and tariff
concession exchanges).
123. See Chalifour, supra note 13, at 584-85.
124. See Chalifour, supra note 13, at 584-85; Jackson, supra note 13, at 1232; Tiefenbrun,
supra note 12, at 263-64.
125. Although tariffs and quotas exist primarily to protect domestic producers from foreign
competition, bans may exist for other reasons, such as to boycott a particular nation for political
reasons or to protect a country's citizens from certain types of products that the nation
considers hazardous, such as drugs, pornography, etc.
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the least preferred type of trade barrier, and GATr/WTO has been reasonably
successful in persuading signatories to convert quotas to tariffs, which can then be
lowered over time.
26
The final type of trade barrier, product standards and specifications' 2 prohibits
importation of products unless they meet certain standards. Examples include
mandatory inspections or approvals for health and safety reasons (agricultural
products and pharmaceuticals), design specifications (ten-mile-per-hour bumpers or
emissions control devices on cars), and labeling requirements (nutritional information
on food packaging). Many, if not most, such barriers are designed to accomplish a
legitimate purpose unconnected to trade or protectionism and typically apply to
domestic products as well. Most of these protections concern matters that a nation
would be unwilling to relinquish control over in the name of freer trade, and not
surprisingly, many are permissible under GATTIWTO provided they are applied
equally to domestic and foreign producers.'
However, other nations and free trade agreements tend to view these barriers with
suspicion." After all, ifa company has to modify its products substantially to comply
with the standards of every nation or if it has to get inspections and approvals both
in its own jurisdiction and in each jurisdiction to which it is exportingproducts, these
requirements can create substantial delays, administrative difficulties, and expense.
In other words, these barriers, even when based on legitimate purposes, can
nonetheless be highly effective barriers to foreign competition, so there is a real
concern that a country might set such standards, in the name of a valid reason, when
in fact its real goal is to protect domestic industry. 3 '
Therefore, free trade agreements such as GATr/WTO must walka delicate balance
between allowing legitimate standards and specifications that nations impose to
protect their citizens and invalidating those restrictions that are promulgated in the
name ofa legitimate purpose while actually serving only to protect a nation's industry
from competition.' 3 ' This can be an enormously difficult task. 3 2 Due to this potential
126. See Chalifour, supra note 13, at 584-85.
127. See Jackson, supra note 13, at 1232, 1235-39.
128. See infra Part V.B.
129. Matthew A. Cole, Examining the Environmental Case Against Free Trade, J. WORLD
TRADE, Oct. 1999, at 183, 183; Goldman, supra note 117, at 1289; Jackson, supra note 13, at
1235.
130. Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 259.
131. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for
an "Aim and Effects" Test, 321NT'LLAw. 619,629 (1998); Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 259.
132. For example, was a Canadian law taxing beverages in aluminum cans more than those
in glass bottles a measure designed to promote conservation and to protect the environment
(since glass is cheaper and easier to recycle and is more frequently recycled) or was it designed
to make American products (which are more commonly distributed in cans than bottles)
comparatively more expensive than Canadian products (which are more commonly distributed
in bottles than cans)? See GAIT Dispute Panel Report on Canada-Import, Distribution, and
Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, Feb. 18, 1992, GAIT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 27, 38, 40, 64-66, 85, 89 (1991-92) [hereinafter Canada Beer II];
GAT Dispute Panel Report on Canada-Import, Distribution, and Sale of Certain Alcoholic
Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 37,
81-84 (1987-88) [hereinafter Canada Beer 1].
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for abuse, a high percentage of GATr/WTO disputes involve possibly disguised
barriers to trade. 33
Unfortunately, many domestic environmental laws and regulations potentially fall
into this gray area of trade law. On their faces, the laws are designed to protect the
health and welfare of a nation's citizens, as well as the environment generally, but
complying with these laws often results in additional costs and expenses for a
manufacturer, expenses a foreign company may not be in a position to undertake.
Additionally, many developing nations harbor hostility toward the industrialized
nations imposing high environmental standards on them,"34 primarily for three
reasons.
First, the standard of living in many developing nations is such that their
governments are more concerned with creatingjobs and income for their citizens than
with requiring aggressive environmental controls that may retard development due
to their costs. 35 Second, environmental regulation is traditionally within a nation's
sovereign jurisdiction.136 Thus, an outsider's attempt to impose its standards on
activities within another nation is often seen as an encroachment upon sovereign
rights. Tied to the sovereignty issue is the fact that developing nations may feel that
lax environmental standards provide therwith one ofthe few competitive advantages
they have in the demanding arena of international trade and investment, so they may
see stricter standards imposed by developed nations as hurting competitiveness.' 3
Third, developing nations regard most of the current global pollution problems as
essentially created by the industrialized nations as they were moving toward the
prosperity they currently enjoy.' Yet these same industrialized nations seem
unwilling to let the developing nations better themselves in the same way."
Furthermore, the industrialized nations seemto expect the developing nations to share
the burden of improving the global environmental situation, even though they do not
share the fault nor do they have the same level of resources available."4 Thus, when
one nation creates environmental regulations hindering another's ability to get its
products into the stream of commerce in the regulating nation, the producing nation
may bring a trade dispute, for the provisions of free trade agreements provide such
a mechanism for determining whether the regulation is a valid provision or a
disguised restriction on trade.
To date, most such environmental disputes brought before the GATr/WTO have
133. See Jackson, supra note 13, at 1232.
134. See Sheila C. Lahey, Trade and the Environment, 16 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
181, 182-83 (1996); Rueda, supra note 20, at 667-68; Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 259.
135. See Lahey, supra note 134, at 191-93; Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 259; Torres, supra
note 52, at 160-62.
136. Dunoff, supra note 92, at 1423-26; Royal C. Gardner, Taking the Principle of Just
Compensation Abroad: Private Property Rights, National Sovereigny, and the Cost of
EnvironmentalProtection, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 539,540 (1997); Lahey, supra note 134, at 182-
83, 191-93; Rueda, supra note 20, at 667-68.
137. See Cole, supra note 129, at 184; Lahey, supra note 134, at 182, 191-93; Rueda, supra
note 20, at 668; Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 259.
138. See Lahey, supra note 134, at 182, 191-93.
139. See id.
140. See id.; Torres, supra note 52, at 160-62.
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been decided in favor of the complaining exporting nation; the environmental
protection law or regulation has been held to violate the requirements of
GATr/WTO.'4 1 In many ways this is not surprising. The people hearing the
complaint are trade experts concerned with whether the terms of a trade agreement,
which largely ignores environmental issues, have been violated.42 The combination
of an unfriendly jury applying an unfriendly set of rules has increasingly produced
dissatisfaction with free trade in theenviromental community."'3
The controversybetween free trade agreements and environmental law firstbecame
a major concern in the mid-1980s, when a GAIT panel upheld a complaint by
Mexico that the United States's Marine Mammal Protection Act,'" which prolibited
the importation of tuna caught by purse seine netting, violated the GATT. 4" This
decision raised alarms in the environmental community by showing that domestic
environmental law could be preempted due to U.S. free trade treaty obligations.'" By
the early 1990s, when the United States was negotiating with Mexico and Canada to
create a North American free trade area, concerns over Mexico's environmental
record and the NAFTA's potential to trump U.S. environmental law culminated in an
environmental side accord as part of the NAFTA package. 4" Since that time,
environmentalists have regularly condemned free trade agreements in general, and
GATTIWTO in particular, for not adequately considering legitimate environmental
objections. 4' This condemnation included rioting at the 1999 WTO ministerial
meeting.
49
For its part, GATT/WTO has tried to become more accommodating toward
legitimate environmental concerns. The founding document of the WTO includes a
call for optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the principle of
sustainable development. 5 ° At the end of 1994, the WTO established the Committee
on Trade and the Environment to consider how best to integrate legitimate
environmental concerns into the free trade framework of GATT/WTO."'
141. See Winter, supra note 4, at 224 n.4; Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at 274.
142. See WESTIN, supra note 16, at 10-12; Brotmann, supra note 5, at 332-33.
143. See WESTIN, supra note 16, at 10-12; Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 273-74; Winter,
supra note 4, at 245.
144. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972, Pub. L. No. 95-522, 86 Stat. 1027
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
145. See Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17; Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17; WESTIN, supra
note 16, at 11, 81-84.
146. See WESTIN, supra note 16, at 11, 81-84.
147. See generally Rueda, supra note 20.
148. See WESTIN, supra note 16, at 10-11.
149. See Chalifour, supra note 13, at 576; Gantz, supra note 12, at 355-57; Tiefenbrun,
supra note 12, at 273-74, 257-60; Winter supra note 4, at 245; Pacts-Should Address
Environment to Boost Public Confidence, NWF Says, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 55 (Jan. 13,
2000); Sam Howe Verhovek & Steven Greenhouse, Seattlels Under CurfewAfrerDisruptions,
N.Y.TMES, Dec. 1, 1999, atAl.
150. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INsTRumENTS-RsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
1 (1994), 33 1.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]; see also Hudnall, supra note 13, at
179-80.
151. Brotmann, supra note 5, at 333-34; Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 278; Winter, supra
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Additionally, recent environmental disputes have shown increasing sensitivity to the
legitimacy of environmental protection laws. 52 To date, however, the environmental
working group has made no significantprogress,'" and environmental disputes before
WTO dispute-resolution panels continue to be resolved in favor of freer trade at the
expense of domestic environmental legislation."
Finally, in addition to the potential preemption of domestic environmental laws by
free trade agreements, there is the issue of the interaction of free trade agreements
with environmental treaties. On a number of occasions, a GATr/WTO dispute-
resolution panel has indicated a greater willingness to accept environmental
protections that would normally constitute violations of GATT/WTO if they arise out
of a multilateral treaty rather than out of unilateral action.' In spite of the
tremendous growth in environmental treaties over the last thirty years, however, a
GATT/WTO panel has never had to resolve a dispute involving an environmental
protection derived from a multilateral environmental treaty.'" In large part this is due
to the vague standards and lack of enforcement mechanisms in most environmental
treaties. Without concrete obligations and the power ofparties to the treaty to enforce
sanctions, most environmental treaties cannot be easily invoked as the reason for
noncompliance under GATr/WTO.' Although this has led some commentators to
call for more detailed and enforceable environmental treaties, it is unclear whether
such treaties are likely in the near future. "'
Furthermore, even if such treaties were adopted, it is not clear that they would
constitute governing law in the event of a conflict with GATTIWTO. Under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in the event of an unresolvable conflict
between the governing provisions of several treaties, the one that is last in time
governs." 9 Given that GATr/WTO has been modified a number of times through
various "rounds" and that future rounds will occur periodically, an argument can be
made that any environmental treaty that was concluded prior to the most recent round
of GATT/WTO is not last in time."W
note 4, at 239-40; Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at 284.
152. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 4, at 241-42.
153. Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 278; Winter, supra note 4, at 240; Wisthoff-Ito, supra
note 20, at 284.
154. See Winter, supra note 4, at 224 n.4.
155. Id. at 234-35,242.
156. Id. at 234-35; Chalifour, supra note 13, at 591-92.
157. For example, the United States was chastised in Shrimp-Turtle for acting unilaterally
and for not engaging in extensive multilateral negotiations; ultimately, the United States lost
the dispute. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 166-69, 188. However, protecting sea turtles, as
an endangered species, was already an obligation for the United States under the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES], and several other
treaties. Of course, these conventions did not specifically authorize a shrimp ban in order to
protect turtles. See Brotmann, supra note 5, at 345-47; Rueda, supra note 20, at 662.
158. See supra Part III.
159. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 30(3), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 339 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
160. See Chalifour, supra note 13, at 591-92; Hudnall, supra note 13, at 192; Winter, supra
note 4, at 237-38.
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Nevertheless, based on the rhetoric of GATT/WTO panels and the increasing
pressure on the WTO to be more environmentally sensitive, there is strong reason to
believe this technical argument would not prevail if a WTO panel were confronted
with a dispute based upon an action taken pursuant to the terms of a sufficiently clear
environmental treaty. Likewise, over time GATT/WTO will probably incorporate
provisions making domestic environmental protections less likely to violate a nation's
obligations under GATT/WTO." However, no one knows how long such
developments will be in coming, and until they arrive, the world remains confronted
with serious environmental problems, a number of nations that are unwilling to take
environmental protection seriously, and a trade-based dispute-resolution regime that
can preempt domestic environmental laws.
V. A TAXING SOLUTION
A. A Domestic Approach with International Overtones
Given the limitations of current international environmental law, and the
GATT/WTO complications affecting attempts to-regulate the global commons, the
question remains, What can be done by any single nation to protect the planet's
environment? Of course, any further domestic environmental progress that is made,
through whatever regulatory method, will have a collateral benefit for the global
environment. However, with the bulk of the world's population and industry located
outside the United States, 62 it seems unlikely that U.S. domestic progress alone will
be enough to solve problems such as the greenhouse effect, the hole in the ozone, and
acid rain. Far more promising is the notion of a pollution tax.
A tax on the amount of pollution that a company produces provides an ongoing
incentive, as technologyprogresses, continually to improve the environmental quality
ofthe productionprocess."63 Provided the expense of installing and utilizingthe more
environmentally friendly technology is less than the long-term cost of the tax, a
company is financially better off using the technology. " If the tax rate is sufficiently
high, older, less efficient technologies willbe replaced continuallybynewer, cheaper,
more efficient technologies.
Thus, taxing a factory on its output of pollution will surely help the environment
161. See Gantz, supra note 12, at 364.
162. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
NATIONALDATA BOOK 832-35 (119th ed. 1999); Int'l Monetary Fund, INT'LFIN. STAT., Mar.
2000, at 62-63.
163. See supra Part ll.B.
164. One exception to this occurs if it appears likely that the cost ofthe technologywifl soon
drop dramatically in price or that a cheaper or more efficient technology is eminent. This is
because taxes must be paid annually but the cost of the technology is often largely a one-time
capital cost. Thus, the first year that a technology is installed may actually be more expensive
than the cost of the taxes for that year, but over a number of years, the savings from installing
the environmentally friendly technology make taking such an action worthwhile. Thus, if it
appears major developments may be forthcoming soon, a company must compare the cost of
successively installing the two technologies against the cost of paying higher taxes short term
and then installing the superior (or drastically reduced price) technology.
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but how can the United States tax companies in other countries for their pollution?
Although the United States could potentially reach the factories of U.S. companies
abroad, as well as the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies,' 6 taxing a foreign-
owned and foreign-based corporation for activities wholly outside the United States
violates basic jurisdictional concepts."6 Furthermore, why would a foreign company
pay such a tax? The United States clearly has little ability to pursue enforcement of
such a claim in a foreign court. Even if the United States can reach the party it wishes
to tax due to activities or assets in the United States, a producer facing such a tax that
ships only limited quantities to the United States may forgo those sales entirely to
avoid paying an exorbitant tax, thereby limiting options for U.S. consumers.
The answer to this dilemma derives from the fact that the United States is the
world's single largest market,67 and thus imports significant levels of goods from
around the world. Since the United States imports a meaningful percentage of the
production of virtually every country on earth, s most companies have a strong desire
for continued access to this market. Thus, many of the world's manufacturers would
be willing to pay apollution tax as a condition of access to the U.S. market, provided
that the tax is reasonable in amount and is equally burdensome to all manufacturers
so that costs can effectively be passed along to U.S. consumers.
This tax will be levied upon every item sold or created in the United States based
on the amount of pollution attributable to its production. 69 In other words, if one
165. See Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for Transnational
Corporations, 25 ENVTL L. 1, 27-28 (1995); cf. I ROBERT C. CAsAD&WILLIAMB. RICHMAN,
JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS §§ 4-1, 4-315], 4-6 (3rd ed. 1998); Mark Gibney & R. David
Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law and the Protection ofHuman
Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations to Domestic and International Standards, 10
TEMP. INT'L&COMP. L.J. 123, 125, 127-32 (1996) (discussing the extraterritorial application
ofTitle VII); Jennifer K. Rankin, U.S. Laws in the Rainforest: Can a U.S. Court FindLiability
for Extraterritorial Pollution Caused by a U.S. Corporation? An Analysis of Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., 18 B.C. INT'L & CoM. L. REv. 221,223-26 (1995).
166. See Rankin, supra note 165, at 225-26. Additionally, this would appear to violate
GATT/WTO. See infra Part V.B.
167. See Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 162, at 62-63. As an individual country, the
United States constitutes the largest market on earth. However, various trading blocks,
particularly the European Union and the area covered by NAFTA (which includes the United
States), constitute larger markets. See id. The proposal set forth would apply with even greater
effectiveness if one or more of these trading blocks chose to adopt similar policies.
168. See id.; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 162, at 805-08.
169. There are other forms of pollution taxes that could also be applied to all products sold
in the United States, but these would not have the extraterritorial pollution-reduction benefits
of a tax based on the level of emissions discharged in the manufacture of a product. For
example, the government could tax all goods sold in the United States with the amount of the
tax being either a set amount or a percentage of sales price. Such a tax, similar to the ubiquitous
sales and value-added taxes that almost all nations have, would clearly be permissible under
current international trade law. See infra Part V.B. However, a uniform tax eliminates a major
benefit of pollution taxes, the incentive for polluters to use more environmentally safe
technology. This incentive is generated by taxing the amount of pollution emitted, but a set tax
or a tax based on sales price burdens all sellers equally regardless of the manufacturing process,
and thus, provides no motivation to invest in cleaner production methods. In fact, the only way
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takes the entire amount of a particular pollutant that a factory emits in a year and
divides by the total number of items produced, the result is the amount of pollution
discharged per item. The tax to be paid would then be the quantity of discharges
attributable to that item multiplied by the applicable tax rate for that pollutant."0 This
creates a regime giving foreign companies that export any meaningful amount of
product into the United States an incentive to install pollution-control devices, while
not creating such a burdensome regime as to discourage them from exporting to the
U.S. market, particularly since domestic companies face the tax as well. Admittedly,
a foreign factory, which likely sells in multiple countries, will not face the same level
of taxation as a factory that produces in the United States or one that sells almost
exclusively in the United States. It will not have the same incentive to install
expensive and technologically advanced equipment as factories facing higher taxes.
However, it is generally agreed that pollution-control devices are exponentially
expensive.' In other words eliminating the first fifty percent of the pollution from
a factory is relatively inexpensive, whereas eliminating the last five to ten percent is
often more expensive than eliminating the first ninety to ninety-five percent Thus,
significant benefits for the global environment can be obtained through a system that
creates moderate financial incentives to install some, or more advanced, pollution-
control devices in nations with minimal or nonexistent environmental regulation.
Of course, for U.S. companies, the government can legally establish virtually any
taxing regime it desires,"u so a pollution tax should present no legal difficulties
domestically. However, as proposed, U.S. companies would overpay somewhat
relative to foreign producers since they would have to pay not only on items sold
domestically, but also on those produced domestically but sold abroad. This burden
is offset by nearly forty years of U.S. environmental regulation that has resulted in
the level of pollutant emissions for individual U.S. factories being lower than for
many other nations. Thus, this disparity should not create a meaningful competitive
advantage for foreign producers. Furthermore, since this disparity runs against
domestic producers, it would not be objectionable under GATT/WTO,In but the
this could even be considered a "pollution tax" is if the proceeds were dedicated to providing
grants for companies to install pollution-control devices. For a discussion of the permissibility
of such subsidies, both domestically and abroad under GATI/WTO, see infra Part V.F. Such
a subsidy could provide significant improvements to the global environment, especially if the
revenues were used to assist in the installation of pollution-control devices in countries with
limited domestic environmental protection obligations. However, tax revenues from an
emissions tax could also be utilized in this manner to obtain the same benefit.
170. Obviously, this regime would require pollution-emissions record keeping. For
discussion of this matter, see infra Part V.D.
171. JAMEs E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND Poucy: A CASE ESSAY ON
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 1940-1975, at
25-26 (1977); Hanna, supra note 36, at 541.
172. Foradiscussion on limits on the federal government's power to tax, see DerekDevgun,
International Fiscal Wars for the Twenty-First Century: An Assessment of Tax-Based Trade
Retaliation, 27 LAW. & PoL'Y. INT'L BUS. 353, 401-19 (1996).
173. GATr Dispute Panel Report on United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain




concept could be modified so that all producers, even domestic ones, are taxed on
only U.S. sales. A disadvantage to this approach is that it would not benefit U.S. air
quality standards as much, and so, overall, it appears desirable to include all U.S.
production in such a tax regime. 4
B. Are Pollution Taxes GATT/WTO Compliant?
Theprimarypurpose of GATT/WTO has been to eliminate nontariffbarriers to free
trade and progressively to decrease tariff barriers through a series of successive
rounds of negotiation." 5 Exporters from developing nations, who generally do not
meet the environmental standards of more developed nations, tend to regard those
standards as nontariff barriers to trade, and thus, lodge complaints with
GATT/WTO.7 6 The task of dispute-resolution panels under GATT/WTO is to
determine whether these environmental protection provisions are really designed to
protect domestic production from foreign competition, as the complaining party
asserts, or whether they are really pursuing legitimate domestic-policy goals, as the
defending nation maintains. Needless to say, in making this determination, the panel
uses the provisions of GATT/WTO, which tend to view all impediments to trade
suspiciously.
There are four principle articles in GATT/WTO that create obligations that may
present problems for a domestic environmental regulation:" article I, which requires
parties to GATT/WTO to treat products from all other GATr/WTO nations the
same;.78 article II, which prohibits any external taxation on foreign goods in excess
of the rates established in the annexes to GATT/WTO; 79 article Il, which requires
parties to GATI'/WTO to treat imports no less favorably than domestically produced
goods when applying domestic taxes and regulations; 8 ° and article XI, which limits
the use of quantitative restrictions, such as quotas, and other nontariff barriers.'
174. Additionally, since U.S. industry has already had to comply with numerous
environmental regulations that will likely lower their per product tax liability compared with
businesses from other nations, not taxing U.S. companies on all of their production increases
the likelihood that the tax would violate GATTWTO as a disguised restriction on trade. See
supra Part IV.
175. Seesupra Part IV. SeegenerallyTiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 262-71 (briefly outlining
the history and development of GATT and the WTO).
176. See supra Part IV.
177. Hudnall, supra note 13, at 183.
178. GATT' 1947, supra note 18, art. I. This provision is commonly known as the "Most
Favored Nation" requirement. Hudnall, supra note 13, at 183.
179. GAIT 1947, supra note 18, art. II. In effect, it establishes maximum tariff rates. Id.
180. GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. III. This provision is commonly known as the
"National Treatment" requirement. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and
Protection ofthe Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. . INT'L L.
268,271 (1997).
181. Additionally, article XIII requires "non-discriminatory administration" of any
"quantitative restrictions" permitted by article XI. GATr 1947, supra note 18, art. XIII.
Furthermore, within the GATT framework, there is an Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (measures designed to protect human, animal, or plant
life or health) that could have an impact on the conformity of an environmental statute with the
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However, even if one or more of these articles is violated by a domestic law, it will,
nonetheless, be permitted under GATT/WTO if it fits within one of the general
exceptions to GATT/WTO compliance enumerated in article XX. "I
The task that remains is to consider these provisions in detail to determine whether
any of the basic articles pose an insuperable barrier to the proposed pollution tax, and
if so, whether article XX provides a valid exception."'
1. Article I-the Most-Favored-Nation Principle
Article I of GATT/WTO provides in pertinent part:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters
referred to in paragraphs [2] and [4] of Article III, any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting partyto anyproduct originating
requirements ofGATT. Agreementon the Application ofSanitaryand PhytosanitaryMeasures,
Apr. 14, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsULTS OFTHE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1 (1994). However, this agreement does not appear to be any way implicated by
an environmental tax regime, and thus, has been excluded from the scope of this Article.
182. GATF 1947, supra note 18, art. XX. Other exceptions exist, including article XIX,
GAIT 1947, supra note 18, art. XIX (concerning emergency action to protect domestic
producers from serious injury), and article XXI, GAT 1947, supra note 18, art. XXI
(concerning national security exemptions). However, these exemptions do not appearto be any
way implicated by a broad-based emissions tax regime, and thus, have been excluded from the
scope of this Article. Notwithstanding the foregoing, GATT/WTO has consistently shown
considerable deference to a nation invoking an article XXI exception,'respecting the nation
itself as the final arbiter of what constitutes a threat to national security. See WESTIN, supra
note 16, at 181-84, 200-01. Given this deference, a credible argument could be made for
pollution taxes on particularly dangerous pollutants, possibly even greenhouse and ozone
depleting gases. However, to apply the national security exception to all pollutants generally
would seem to strain the article XXI exception past the breaking point. For an argument
concerning the use ofthe article XXI exception forpollution taxes, see id. at 181-84, 198,209-
210.
183. This Article will now consider the permissibility of the pollution tax under each of
these articles, as well as under the relevant prior decisions of GAIT/WTO dispute-resolution
bodies, which, while not binding on future panels, may shed significant light on how future
panels may respond. No GA'TI/WTO panel has ever considered a situation such as the
pollution tax proposed above, so there is no way of knowing definitively how a WTO panel
will react to a per-unit-of-production-based pollution tax. To date virtually all of the domestic
environmental laws that have been questioned under GATT/WTO have involved importation
bans on certain products, so there has been analysis of both article X1 and of whether the
exceptions in article XX were met for domestic laws that violate article XI. See, e.g., Shrimp-
Turtle, supra note 17; Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17; Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17;
Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17. Similarly, there have been disputes concerning whether a tax
regime provides national treatment under article III, see, e.g., Canada Beer II, supra note 132;
Canada Beer I, supra note 132; U.S. Superfund, supra note 173, but little in the way of
analysis of an environmental tax that has implications for the production process.
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in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of
all other contracting parties.'I
Thus, the most-favored-nation principle of article I prohibits a party from
discriminating among "like products" based on their national origin.' In essence, it
requires each member of GATTIWTO to provide unconditionally all advantages it
grants to products from any country to any like product from all other members.'
This obligation applies not only to rules and customs associated with imports and
exports, but also to any internal taxes, charges, laws, and domestic regulations of a
product's distribution, sale, and use."8 7
Clearly, the crux of article I is the phrase "like product." First, GATI'/WTO panels
use the ordinary sense of "like," meaning the same or similar, when determining
whether a product is a "like product" for GATT/WTO purposes.'88 However, items
need not be identical to be "like."'8 9 Rather the concept of "like product" can apply
if two products share similar features, such as physical characteristics, end use, or a
common tariff classification. 9 Additionally, the idea of "like product" is to be
applied objectively to the products in question, based on their characteristics, not
subjectively by taling into account the purpose behind the regulatory measure in
184. GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. I(1).
185. Id.; Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT Conflict and
Resolution?, 26 ENVTL L. 841, 848 (1996).
186. GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. I(1). It should come as no surprise to anyone familiar
with the special treatment provided to members of free trade areas that there are a variety of
significant standing exceptions to article I(1). A number of these exceptions are set forth in the
remainder of article I and in article XXIV, concerning customs unions and free trade areas.
GATT 1947, supra note 18, arts. 1(2), XXIV.
187. See Wold, supra note 185, at 848.
188. GAIT Dispute Panel Report on United States-Taxes on Automobiles, DS3 I/R (Sept.
29, 1994), 1994 GATTPD LEXIS 8 [hereinafter Taxes on Autos 1].
189. This makes sense considering few products are truly identical. A Jeep Grand Cherokee
is similar to, but certainly not identical to, a Nissan Pathfinder.
190. Taxes on Autos I, supra note 188. In fact, the panel in WTO Appellate Body Report on
Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS Il/AB/R
(Oct. 4, 1996), http:www.wto.orgtddflep/A3/A395 I e.wpf [hereinafter Taxes on Alcohol I1],
noted that the definition of a "like product" can change depending on which article of GATT
is being evaluated:
[Tjhere can be no one precise and absolute definition of what is "like." The
concept of "likeness" is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. The
accordion of "likeness" stretches and squeezes in different places as different
provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The width of the accordion in any
one of those places must be determined by the particular provision in which the
term "like" is encountered as well as by the context and the circumstances that
prevail in any given case to which that provision may apply.
Id. at 21-22.
Thus in interpreting article 111(2), a provision where likeness is narrowly construed, it was
possible to find that Sochu and Vodka are alike but automobiles that cost more than $30,000
are not like automobiles costing less than $30,000. See id. at 37; Taxes on Autos I, supra note
188.
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question.191
It is hard to imagine how the proposed pollution tax might implicate any of these
elements. If all products are subjected to the same rate of tax based on the quantity
ofpollutants attributable to them, similarity of items is not even an issue. An analogy
is a one percent sales tax on imports levied at the border to build domestic highways:
although such a tax may violate other provisions of GATr/WTO,' there is no
danger of like products being treated in a disparate manner.
In point of fact, such a border tax, or the pollution tax, could be set at different
rates for different types of products without violating the concept of "like treatment"
of "like products" on the criteria discussed so far. The rate of tax on sulfur dioxide
emissions, for example, could be set at one rate per metric ton in car production and
at a different rate in glass bottle production without treating like products differently,
just as the highway border tax could be set at one percent of sales price for oranges
and one half ofa percent for cars. In fact, such differentiation might be highly useful
in maling sure proper incentives are maintained for various industries to use the
relevant available pollution-control devices without driving certain industries out of
business. 93
Most importantly for purposes of the proposed pollution tax, the concept of "like
product" also refers to the product itself and not to its method ofproduction." Thus
if there is no tax or duty on car imports from one member country, there cannot be a
tax or duty on the cars from another member, even though different production
processes were employed in the manufacture of the two.
What is somewhat less clear, however, is whether the actual amount of tax can vary
based on differences in the production process so long as the rate of tax is based on
the same criteria for like products. Clearly, like products do not have to be taxed
exactly the same-a $20,000 car can be taxed less than, but at the same rate as, a
$22,000 car. The cars are being treated as like products in the percentage rate of tax
applied, but not in the total amount of tax to be paid. However, in some sense the
difference in treatment is based on a way in which the cars, as products, differ on
their price; not on a difference in the way in which they were manufactured. This
ambiguity need not be definitively resolved at this time since the pollution tax would
also be applied to domestic production, notjust to "like" foreign goods, so the terms
of article IH, concerning domestic taxes should govern most potential disputes. 95
191. Taxes on Alcohol If, supra note 190, at 6,21-23.
192. In fact such a border tax would violate article II as a tax in excess of the stated
maximum tariffs that is not also applied to like domestic goods. See infra Part V.B.2.
193. As is discussed in more detail in Part II.B, reducing emissions of a particular pollutant
may be much more costly for one industry than for another, and of course, different industries
have varying abilities to absorb or pass on the costs of such a tax (or pollution-control
technologies) to consumers. In other words, a tax set high enough to create an incentive for all
industries to install better pollution-control devices might be so high on certain industries (even
after using available pollution-control technologies, given the amount consumers are willing
to pay for this product and the costs such taxes and technology add to the product) that such
industries' products will not be purchased by consumers.
194. See Ilona Cheyne, Environmental Unilateralism and the WTO/GA TTSystem, 24 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 433,437-38 (1995) (discussing Dolphin-Tuna 1).
195. Furthermore, since a similar rule exists under article III, GAIT 1947, supra note 18,
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2. Articles II and Ill-Internal and External Taxes and
National Treatment
As a general matter, GATT/WTO has a strong preference for taxes over other
forms of trade barriers." Itwas the goal of the GATT from its inceptionto eliminate
nontariff trade barriers or at least to convert them into tariffs." Based on this history
and the outcomes of several major environmental trade disputes,' some
commentators have concluded that a similar statement can be made about the
GATT/WTO Secretariat's attitude toward attempts to improve the environment: the
Secretariat favors the use of "carrots," economic incentives such as taxes and
pollution trading regimes, to the "sticks" of command-and-control regulation."S
However, the question remains just what type of taxes will be permissible under
GATT/WTO.
GATT/WTO distinguishes between two types of taxation, external and internal.
External taxes, like customs, duties and other import charges, are governed by article
11(1), (2)2' which provide in relevant part:
I. (a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other
contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the
appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement.
(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any
contracting party, which are the products of territories of other contracting
parties, shall, on their importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates,
and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule,
be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided
for therein. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges
of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation in excess of those
imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required
to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that
date.
(c) .... [Subparagraph (c) mimics subparagraph (b) for products in Part II,
with conforming changes since these products are entitled to preferential
treatment, and adds a stipulation that contracting parties may maintain eligibility
requirements for such preferential rates of duty.]
art. 1II, as amended by Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14, 1948,62 U.N.T.S. 80, 82 (requiring like foreign products to be
treated no less favorably than their domestic counterparts), the analysis ofwhether a difference
in tax based on production processes is permitted under article III should also provide
significant insight into the issue of whether such a difference is acceptable under article I.
196. Taxes are more transparent than nonquantitative restrictions, and once various forms
ofnonquantitative restrictions have been eliminated or converted into quantitative restrictions
(taxes, duties, and charges), subsequent trade liberalization becomes easier through successive
negotiations to lower the quantitative barriers. See supra Part IV.
197. See supra Part IV.
198. See infra Part V.B.3 (discussing Dolphin-Tuna I and Dolphin-Tuna I).
199. Howard F. Chang, Carrots, Sticks andInternationalExternalities, 17 INT'LREV. L. &
ECON. 309, 309-10 (1997); see also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and
Protection ofthe Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
268, 305 & n.276 (1997).
200. Schoenbaum, supra note 199, at 306.
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2. Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing
at any time on the importation of any product
(a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the
provisions of paragraph [2] of Article III in respect of the like domestic product
or in respect of an article from which the imported product has been
manufactured or produced in whole or in part .... 201
Thus, article 1[ primarily serves to establish the maximum rates of duty that can be
charged in connection with the importation of a product into the country.2" However,
paragraph 2 explicitly excludes any charge that is the equivalent of an internal tax,
provided the charge is applied in a manner consistent with article 1H. This is true even
if the tax is collected at the border at the time of importation. 3 As a result, a
pollution tax only on foreign goods would be impermissible as an import charge to
the degree the tax would cause the total of all importation fees to exceed the
maximum permitted by the appropriate schedule to GATTiWTO, but would be
permissible, as an internal tax, if the same charge were applied to domestic goods as
well. Since virtually all nations already apply the maximum tariff permitted by
GATr/WTO on practically all products,2°4 the only way a pollution tax collected at
the border could be GATT/WTO compliant is if it is an internal tax permitted under
article H. In other words, the key issue as to the acceptability of a pollution tax turns
not on article II, but on article IH.
Article I permits internal taxes-taxes imposed on domestic products-to be
imposed on importedproducts in anondiscriminatorymanner. Itprovides inpertinent
part:
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and
internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of
products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported
or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly,
201. GAIT 1947, supra note 18, art. 11(l), (2).
202. Note how article II prohibits (or limits) the border tax, see supra Part V.B.1, provided
that the other tariffs and duties imposed by such a nation are at (or near) the maximum
permitted by the appropriate schedule to GATI/WTO.
203. "Any internal tax ... which applies to an imported product and to the like domestic
product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of
importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax .... GATT 1947, supra note 18,
Annex I, ad art. III, as amended by Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14, 1948, 62 U.N.T.S. 80, 104.
204. This should not be surprising given the multiple rounds of tariff reductions that have
occurred to the GAT schedules since its inception in 1947. With this history of past rounds,
together with the prospect of future rounds, only the most foolhardy of nations would
unilaterally lower its tariffs below the maximum permitted. Such lowering would not only
expose domestic producers to additional competition, but also undermine the nation's
bargaining position at a future tariffreduction negotiation (since it would be hard to argue for
much of a concession from other nations for lowering a maximum tariff rate that is not being
enforced to its highest level).
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to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied,
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party
shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or
domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
3.
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use .... 0s
Three obligations clearly arise from the plain text of article III. First, paragraph 1
prohibits both quantitative and nonquantitative restrictions from being used to afford
protection from foreign competition. This is an overarching obligation running
through various articles concerning taxes and those concerning nontariffbarriers that
could be used to invalidate an otherwise valid charge or nontariff barrier if it could
be shown that this action had been taken for the purpose of protecting domestic
production.2" Although this does not occur often, it might be shown where the
legislative history of a domestic law shows it was enacted to protect domestic
industry.
Of course, this would not apply to the proposed tax unless Congress in adopting
it offered some commentary indicating it did so to protect domestic manufacturers
from foreign competition. Although this might seem to be a stretch for a tax based on
the amount of pollution attributable to the production of a product, it must be
remembered that all U.S. companies have been subjected to stringent environmental
controls for nearly forty years,2"7 and so, foreign producers may, in fact, face
potentially higher tax burdens than their domestic competitors that have already
installed various pollution-control devices, a fact that would not escape the attention
of Congress.
However, even if the legislature does not show any intent to discriminate on the
record, a facially neutral law that has the effect of providing protection to domestic
production will still run afoul of paragraph 1.108 On the one hand, given the
205. GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. II, as amended by Protocol Modifying Part II and
Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14,1948,62 U.N.T.S. 80,
82.
206. Of course, this rule does not apply to actions taken to protect domestic production that
are specifically authorized, such as in article XIX. GAT 1947, supra note 18, art. XIX
(concerning emergency action to protect domestic production from serious injury).
207. See supra Part II.A.
208. This is made explicit by the last sentence of article I(2), which makes clear (by tying
the permissibility of internal taxes to the prohibition against actions that have the consequence
of protecting domestic production in paragraph 1) that domestic taxes on imports, even if
equally applied to domestic products, are impermissible if the effect of such laws is to protect
domestic production. GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. 111(1), (2), as amended by Protocol
Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14,
1948, 62 U.N.T.S. 80, 82. For example, a Canadian law that on its face seemed to apply
neutrally, by taxing both foreign and domestic beer cans at a rate higher than beer bottles, was
found to protect domestic production once it became clear that Canadian manufacturers
overwhelmingly produce beer in bottles, whereas U.S. manufacturers, exporting the largest
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potentially lower tax burden for domestic manufacturers, due to pollution-control
devices that have already been installed to comply with current environmental
regulations, the tax could potentially violate article MI. On the other hand, given the
exponential costs ofpollution controls ° and the fact that domestic producers will be
taxed on all their emissions whereas foreign producers will be taxed only on products
sold in the United States, domestic producers may not receive a competitive
advantage. Thus, before enacting the proposed tax, Congress should study whether
the tax would in factprotect domestic production, which would violate GATT/WTO.
If the tax would protect domestic manufacturers,21 ° a different, lower rate of tax could
be applied to foreign producers temporarily, since the other obligations of article Ill
merely require that internal taxes on foreign goods not exceed those on domestic
goods.211
The second obligation is that a party to GATT/WTO cannot charge internal taxes
in excess of those it charges on like domestic products. 21 This clarifies, by
implication, that nations may subject imports to the full range of taxes, charges, and
fees to which domestic items are subject. This obligation in many ways folds neatly
into the third one: that foreign products be treated no less favorably than like
domestic ones.2 3 Foreign products are entitled to "national treatment," the same
quantity of beer into Canada, produce a majority of their beers in cans. See Canada Beer II,
supra note 132; Canada Beer I, supra note 132. A similar analysis applied to a EU dispute
where France imposed different tax rates for cars with engines with less than 16CV than for
cars with engines larger than 16CV. While appearing to be an internal tax applied equally to
like domestic and foreign products, it was held to be, in effect, a law protecting domestic
production since virtually all French car manufacturing was of cars with horsepower low
enough to qualify for the lower tax rate. Case 112/84, Humblot v. Directeur des Services
Fiscaux, 1985 E.C.R. 1367. For a discussion ofthe need for internal taxes to treat like products
comparably, see infra notes 212-30 and accompanying text.
209. See KRIER & URSIN, supra note 171, at 25-26; Hanna, supra note 36, at 541.
210. This protection would exist only during a transition period when foreign companies are
adding new basic pollution-control devices, an expense domestic producers do not share.
211. Unfortunately, given the requirement of most-favored-nation treatment from article I
for like products, a different tax rate could not be applied to nations that have a history of
strong environmental regulation (which would not need the lower tax rate since their
manufacturers would presumably not be at a competitive disadvantage with U.S.
manufacturers) than the one applied to nations with a history of lax or nonexistent
environmental regulation without violating article I. See Robert F. Housman & Durwood .
Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development: A Primer, 15 HAsTINGS INT'L &
Comp. L. REv. 535 (1992); Stefan R. Miller, Comment, NAFT,4:A Modelfor Reconciling the
ConflictBetween Free Trade and International Environmental Protection, 56 U. PITT. L.REv.
483, 492 (1994). However, a different rate could be used between various nations if the tax
meets the requirements of an article XX exemption, since the exemptions are for violations of
other articles, such as I, I1 or XI. See GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. XX; infra Part V.B.4.
212. GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. I1(2), as amended by Protocol Modifying Part II and
Article XXVI ofthe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14, 1948, 62 U.N.T.S. 80,
82.
213. GAT 1947, supra note 18, art. 111(4), as amended by Protocol Modifying Part II and




treatment applied to like domestic products.214 Thus, the obligation not to tax the
foreign product more than the domestic one is expanded to include the right not to be
subjected to different or additional legal requirements of other sorts, such as
inspections, labeling, permitting procedures and requirements. Prima facie, the
pollution tax seems to comply with article III. Prior GATT/WTO decisions have
made clear that the GATT/WTO does not distinguish between taxes with different
policy purposes, provided the purpose is not to protect domestic production from
foreign competition.215 As the GATT panel stated in U.S. Superfund:
[T]he tax adjustment rules of the General Agreement distinguish between taxes
on products and taxes not directly levied on products; they do not distinguish
between taxes with different policy purposes. Whether a sales tax is levied on a
product for general revenue purposes or to encourage the rational use of
environmental resources, is therefore not relevant for the determination of the
eligibility of a tax for border tax adjustment.""
Thus, the fact that the purpose of the tax is for pollution control is irrelevant to an
article III analysis."
Once again, the key issue is what constitutes a like product. A per-unit-of-
production pollution tax looks not only to the finished product but also to the
production process used to make it by taxing based on the pollution generated in
connection with production.21 Thus, as has been noted, all products are treated as like
214. See id.
215. See, e.g., U.S. Superfund, supra note 173; see also Schoenbaum, supra note 199, at
308.
216. U.S. Superfund, supra note 173, at 161. For a comparison of direct and indirect
taxation and for a discussion of the border-tax-adjustment mechanism, see infra text
accompanying notes 220-26.
217. Thus, the types of pollution taxes described in note 169 are clearly permissible under
GATT/WTO. A tax that is a set amount or that is based on a fixed percentage of sales price that
is applied equally to all products, both foreign and domestic, complies with both paragraphs
2 and 3, for all products are treated alike. See GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. 111(2), (3), as
amended by Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Sept. 14, 1948, 62 U.N.T.S. 80, 82. Foreign products are not being subjected to
higher taxes or other legal requirements not imposed on domestic products. In fact, different
percentage tax rates or set amounts of tax could be used for different categories of products so
long as like products are treated the same (so there could be a different rate for automobiles
than for lumber, for example). The fact that the revenues from such taxes are used for pollution
control or remediation activities would not affect the validity of the tax.
218. With regard to pollution taxes based on sales prices or a fixed amount of tax, there is
ample history under GATT/WTO and sufficient government experience to make the
classification of products relatively easy so long as it is based on their finished characteristics
and so long as categories are not too finely differentiated. Of course, any classification scheme
can have controversies at the margins, and there are easy examples of times when products
should be treated as like products where treating them differently would clearly be erroneous.
However, drawing the line between what is a like product and what is not, based solely on the
finished product and its characteristics, is something governments do all the time and thus
presents no meaningful conceptual difficulties for such a pollution tax regime that are not
encountered by luxury-tax systems, differing inspection, permitting and safety-standard
[Vol. 76:4
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAND FREE TRADE
products in the sense that they are subject to the same rate of tax. However, products
that in every way appear identical could be subject to a different rate of tax based on
the production method used, and are, therefore, in some sense not being treated as
like products. The question is whether a higher total tax on a foreign product that is
substantially the same as a domestic product other than the fact that it was
manufactured using a process that discharges more pollutants violates the article I
requirement that foreign products cannot be taxed atahigher rate than a like domestic
product.
The answer to this question derives from the fact that such an environmental tax
is an internal tax, a tax applied to domestic products too, thatis subject to article m.
This tax will be collected not at the point of sale but rather at the point of entry, at the
border, to equalize the taxes paid by similar domestic products at their point of
production.2 19 In other words, the tax is controlled by GATT/WTO's border-tax-
adjustment rules ("BTA"). BTA is a mechanism that allows imported products to be
charged the same amount of internal taxes as similar domestic products. Since its
inception, GATT/WTO has distinguished between two types of taxes--direct taxes
and indirect taxes. ' ° Indirect taxes are those imposed on products themselves such
as sales, excise, value added, franchise, transfer, stamp, inventory, and equipment
taxes and other taxes that are not direct taxes.? 1 Direct taxes are taxes on wages,
interest, rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership
of real property.m Only indirect taxes are eligible for BTA under GATT/WTO. Is
a per-unit-based-production pollution tax a direct or an indirect tax?
The GAT Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments made clear that direct taxes
such as social security and payroll taxes were not subject to BTA. 4 Most direct taxes
are taxes on incomes related to the product tm whereas a pollution tax has nothing to
requirements, and many other governmental regulations that subject various products to one
or more special types of treatment compared with other products.
219. Even though this tax is collected at the border, it is still considered an internal tax, for
as note ad article III makes clear: "Any internal tax... which applies to an imported product
and to the like domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported
product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax.
.. ." GATT 1947, supra note 18, Annex I, ad art. III, as amended by Protocol Modifying Part
II and Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14, 1948, 62
U.N.T.S. 80, 104.
220. Schoenbaum, supra note 199, at 306.
221. Paul Demaret& Raoul Stewardson, Border Tax.Adjustments Under GAYTandECLaw
and General Implicationsfor Environmental Taxes, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1994, at 5 (citing
note annexed to the 1979 Subsidies Code), reprinted in WESTIN, supra note 16, at 65, 73;
Schoenbaum, supra note 199, at 307.
222. Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 221, at 5 (citing note annexed to the 1979 Subsidies
Code), reprinted in WESTIN, supra note 16, at 65, 73; Schoenbaun, supra note 199, at 307.
223. Demaret&Stewardson, supranote221, at5 (citing note annexed to the 1979 Subsidies
Code), reprinted in WESTIN, supra note 16, at 65, 73; Schoenbaum, supra note 199, at 307
(citing GATT Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, Dec. 2, 1970, GATT B.I.S.D. (18th
Supp.) at 97, 100-01, 14 (1972)).
224. Schoenbaum, supra note 199, at 307 (citing GAT Working Party on Border Tax
Adjustments, Dec. 2, 1970, GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 97, 100-01, 14 (1972)).
225. In other words, various people earned money in connection with the product and that
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do with income. Similarly, it is unclear how a pollution tax is a tax related to the
ownership of property, as is a tax on the land where the factory is located. Thus on
a narrow reading of the descriptions of direct taxes made by the WTO and its
predecessors, it is not entirely clear whether a pollution tax would be a direct tax.
However, it looks to the production process, just as a property tax or an income tax
does, and is in this sense "direct." This was enough to convince at least one
commentator that a pollution emissions tax is a direct tax that would be an
impermissible differentiation of otherwise like products under GATr/WTO article
111.n2
However, unlike taxes on property ownership and income, a tax on the pollution
emitted in connection with the production of a product can be seen as a tax on the
consumption of a resource that went in to the finished product.22 In the U.S.
Superfund case, the GAIT panel indicated that a tax on an input into a product that
is incorporated into the finished product itself (in other words, a tax on raw materials
or feedstocks that are used to make a product) could be subject to BTA and could
comply with article Mn."23 Given that a WTO panel decision has held clean air to be
an exhaustible resource,29 it is at least conceivable that a tax based on the amount of
pollution created during production, as a measure of the consumption of clean air,
water, or land as a resource, could be subject to the BTA if it is considered to be a
raw material consumed during production. However, in the situation of taxing
feedstocks, there is a physical item being incorporated into the finished product, even
if the item is completely consumed. With a pollution tax, it is far harder to claim a
physical input is being taxed. Thus, there is some hope that an emissions tax might
not violate article III by treating like products differently, but it seems unlikely to
succeed." °
income is what the tax is being levied upon.
226. Schoenbaum, supra note 199, at 307 (citing GATr Working Party on Border Tax
Adjustments, Dec. 2, 1970, GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 97, 100-01, 14 (1972)); see also
infra Part V.B.4 (regardingthe GATTpanel position thattunaproduced using dolphin-safe and
dolphin-endangering methods of harvesting were like products for purposes of application of
internal regulations under article I1(4), since the production process was the only difference
between the two, not the finished product).
227. Clean air, water, or land were consumed or destroyed by the production process.
228. U.S. Superfund, supra note 173, at 163-64 (finding that a BTA on chemical feedstocks
used in the production process was acceptable even though the tax was based on the amount
of the chemicals used rather than based on the finished product itself); see also WESTIN, supra
note 16, at 66, 80, 100-01.
229. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17, at 612 (summarizing WTO Dispute Panel
Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/SD2/R
(Jan. 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 274,299 (1996)).
230. Schoenbaum, supra note 199, at310. Furthermore, the permissibility ofa BTA, in the
form of a tax remission for an export, based upon materials consumed during production has
been held to be acceptable. See US. Superfund, supra note 173. However, there has not been
a dispute to date over a BTA tax imposed on an import based on the consumption of
feedstocks. Thus, it is possible the rules might be somewhat different depending upon the type
of BTA involved.
[Vol. 76:4
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAND FREE TRADE
3. Article XI-General Elimination of Quantitative
Restrictions
Article XI provides in relevant part:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product ofthe territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale
for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting
party.23'
In essence, article XI serves to eliminate most forms of quotas, import restrictions,
bans, and licensing affecting the importation of goods from another contracting
party.12 As has been noted, a major goal of GAT/WTO has been to move away
from all forms of trade barriers other than tariffs.0 3 Although a pollution tax should
not be affected by article X in any way, - this article has been at the forefront of
many of the GATIYWTO environmental disputes." s Since much of the authority
concerning environmental disputes under the GATT/WTO has been produced under
this provision, it is worth examining its scope.
There have been several disputes involving bans on the importation of products
produced in a way that harms the environment. In particular, U.S. embargoes against
tuna caught in a manner that kills dolphins236 and against shrimp caught in a manner
that endangers sea turtles. As bans on importation, it would seem relatively clear
that each of these violated article XI unless an exception could be found in paragraph
2, and that the entire proceeding should focus on whether an article XX exemption
applies.
However, in the Dolphin-Tuna Icase, the United States tried to argue that the ban
was in effect an internal regulation governed by article m11(4), as a regulation relating
to the sale of a like product.3 9 The GATT panel rejected this argument, concluding,
inter alia, that the banned tuna and the permitted tuna were like products, that the
differences between them were in their production processes and that differences in
the production process do not remove the two types of tuna from the purview of like
products.' Because both types of tuna are like products, article 111(4) requires that
23 1. GAIT 1947, supra note 18, art. XI; see also id. art. XI(2) (listing various exceptions).
232. Housman & Zaelke, supra note 211, at 542.
233. See supra Part IV.
234. GAT r1947, supra note 18, art. XI(l), (2). Article XI prohibits actions otherthan taxes,
which are governed by other articles. See GAIT 1947, supra note 18, arts. I, 1H.
235. See, e.g.,Shrimp-Turtlesupra note 17; Dolphin-TunaI, supra note 17;Dolphin-Tuna
I, supra note 17.
236. Dolphin-Tuna , supra note 17; Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17.
237. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17.
238. These exceptions would not apply since they relate to export prohibitions regulating
the food supply and regulations regarding the classification or grading of commodities. GAIT
1947, supra note 18, art. XI(2)(b).
239. Dolphin-Tuna!, supra note 17, at 164-68.
240. Id. at 193-96.
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they be treated the same, and since they are not, the embargo is effectively a
nonquantitative restriction governed by article X. 24
Dolphin-Tuna /potentially clarifies several important issues.242 First, it highlights
that article 111(4) permits the complete ban of a product as an internal regulation
provided that the regulation applies equally to domestic products.243 In other words,
a nation can opt for no trade in a commodity but cannot unfairly protect domestic
trade in it.
Second, and more controversially, it brought the product-process distinction to the
forefront of much GATT/WTO scholarship, with the prevailing sentiment being that
GATT/WTO permits only those distinctions based on the product, not those based
on the process used to create the product' Such a stance appears to strengthen the
argument that article H(2) should not permit a BTA for pollution taxes, since such
a tax is clearly based on the productionprocess rather than the finished product. This
view takes the holding of Dolphin-Tuna I!too far, however. The holding should be
read as narrowly limited to article 111(4) because it concerned a ban rather than a
tax.2" After all, the consequence of not meeting the U.S. standards resulted in the
foreignproduct being excluded fromtheUnited States, whereas the domestic product
that was in compliance was freely traded. A pollution tax, on the other hand, applies
the same rate to both products equally. The only difference is the amount of the tax
to be paid.
More recent dispute-panel reports have tended not to focus on the process-product
distinction when deciding GATT/WTO environmental disputes.2 " Thus, one must be
cautious about extending the process-product distinction in GATr/WTO
jurisprudence from Dolphin-Tuna II too far. In fact, the Shrimp-Turtle decision
appears to permit discrimination betweenproducts, theoretically, based on differences
in production process, at least within the context of the article XX(g) exception to
GATT/WTO compliance.' 7 In sum, therefore, it remains somewhat unclear whether
an emissions tax based on inputs consumed would violate article 111(2) for treating
like products disparately."8
241. Id.
242. The author uses the word "potentially" because neither of these panel reports was
adopted and because both were decided prior to the formation ofthe WTO (when the WTO was
formed, there were a number of changes to the terms of GATT and its related agreements,
particularly with regard to acknowledging the importance of environmental issues). See supra
note 150 and accompanying text.
243. See Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17, at 193-96. A nation could completely ban
pornography or even shampoo without the need to invoke an exception or exemption to the
limits on the use of nonquantitative barriers to trade. See GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. III,
as amended by Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14, 1948, 62 U.N.T.S. 80, 82; Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17.
244. Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17, at 193-96; see also Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17,
at 888-90.
245. Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17, at 889-90.
246. See generally Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17; Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17.
247. See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, In 138-45.
248. For further discussion of this matter, see infra Part V.B.4.
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4. Article XX-Exemptions
Although it is clear that certain types of pollution taxes, such as those charging a
fixed amount or based on a percentage of the price, are permitted under article III(2),
it remains at best questionable whether a pollutant discharge tax would be in
compliance with article 1I(2).'49 Furthermore, applying different tax rates to nations
at various levels of environmental development would clearly violate article I.'
Thus, it is important to examine the exemptions to GATT/WTO compliance since if
one of these applies, violations of article I or III would be excused. The relevant
portions of article XX, putting forth the general exemptions, state:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
1. (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption ......
A party hoping to impose an measure inconsistent with GATT/WTO, whether
designed to prevent environmental harm or for any other potentially exempted
purpose, must meet three requirements. 2 First, the general design of the
GATI/WTO inconsistent measure must fall within the general scope of the relevant
provision of article XX.? Second, the measure must meet the specific test required
by the relevant provision of article XX. For environmental matters, it must either meet
the test of subparagraph (b), as necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health, or subparagraph (g), as primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible
natural resource.' Third, it must meet the test enunciated in the introduction to
article XX, known as the "chapeau test": The measure must not be applied in a
manner that constitutes an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against countries
where the same conditions prevail, nor in a manner that constitutes a disguised
restriction on trade. 5 A recent appellate bodyreport makes clear that the examination
249. See supra Part V.B.2.
250. See supra Part V.B.1.
251. GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. XX.
252. See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 1118-19; see also Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17,
at 890-91, 895; Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17, at 197-201. See generally Wold, supra note
185, at 862-63.
253. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, In 118-19; see also Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17, at
891-93, 895-96; Dolphin-Tuna !, supra note 17, at 197-201.
254. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, % 113-14; see also GATT 1947, supra note 18, art.
XX(b), (g); Dolphin-Tuna 1I, supra note 17, at 890-99; Dolphin-Tuna !, supra note 17, at 197-
201.
255. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 147; see also Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17, at 873,
876; Dolphin-Tuna , supra note 17.
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must proceed in this order, as well.'
Turning to the first element, one must ask whether a GATr/WTO inconsistent
measure falls within the general scope ofan article XX exemption. For environmental
matters, this means that the policy supporting the measure must either be aimed at
protecting human, animal, or plant life or health under subparagraph (b) or related to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources under subparagraph (g).' This
requirement has easily been met in the major environmental disputes under
GATr/WTO and appears not really to be an issue. 8 An emissions tax is clearly
designed to help minimize the level of contamination in the air and water, which
obviously protects the life and health of humans, animals, and plants. With regard to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, previous WTO panels have held
that nonmineral items, such as animals 9 and clean air,2" qualify, so a pollution tax
would seem to fit within the policy goal of conserving exhaustible natural resources.
Turning to the next requirement, are the specific requirements of either
subparagraph (b) or (g) met? Historically, it has been virtually impossible to meet the
requirements imposed by subparagraph (b) to the satisfaction GATT/WTO dispute-
resolution panels." This may no longer be true, given the changes to the
GATT/WTO regime created by the Uruguay Round and the Marrakesh Accord that
compel greater attention to environmental issues. 2 However, absent a post-WTO
formation GATT panel report discussing the current standards applicable to
subparagraph (b), one is compelled to consider the standards as they have historically
been enunciated.263
According to Dolphin-Tuna I and II, the crux of the matter in deciding whether
subparagraph (b) has been met turns on the word "necessary" in the phrase
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."2 4 The panels have
applied a narrow reading to the term "necessary" concluding that for a measure to fall
256. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 114-22; see also Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at 266.
257. Schoenbaum, supra note 199, at 276-77; Wold, supra note 185, at 855.
258. See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 127-28; Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17,
at 612 (summarizing WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/SD2/R (Jan. 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 274, 299
(1996)); Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17, at 890-93; Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17, at 197-
201; Wold, supra note 185.
259. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, % 127-28.
260. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17, at 612 (summarizing WTO Dispute Panel
Report on United States-Standards forReformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/SD2/R
(Jan. 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 274, 299 (1996)).
261. See id. (summarizing WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/SD2/R (Jan. 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 274,296-98
(1996)); see also Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17, at 898; Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17, at
200.
262. Cf. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 161. However, the appellate decision in Shrimp
Turtle did not consider article XX(b) since it determined that the U.S. law in question came
within article XX(g). See Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at 267.
263. Recently, a dispute panel upheld a ban on chrysotile asbestos under article XX, but the
terms of the decision have not yet been released. WTO PanelIssues Ruling Upholding French
Ban of Chrysotile Asbestos, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1180, 1180-81 (July 27, 2000).
264. Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17, at 896-98; Dolphin-Tuna I,supra note 17, at 198-200.
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within the exemption enunciated in subparagraph (b), the measure must be the least
GATr/WTO inconsistent measure reasonably available to the party to render such
protection.265 Not surprisingly, bans that can be avoided only when other parties
modify their own legal regimes to comply with the embargoing country's law have
not been found to be the least GATT/WTO inconsistent method.2" It is possible,
therefore, that a pollution tax could pass muster under the "least GATr/WTO
inconsistent' standard since the only potential inconsistency from the requirements
of GATT is in subjecting "like products" to unequal indirect taxes. However, this
inconsistency exists only if the BTA is indirect, which is debatable. This minor
inconsistency, if it exists at all, is further diminished by the fact that, unlike product
bans, a tax difference does not require other nations to change their domestic legal
regimes in order for their industries to trade with the nation imposing the GATT
inconsistent standard. Each company remains free to pay the tax or to install devices
to reduce the tax."
Probably the most troubling notion contained in one panel report was that the
environmental measure, the ban, was not "necessary" because the banning nation had
not exhausted all less restrictive alternative measures available to it; namely it had not
engaged in extensive multilateral negotiations to form a treaty to deal with the
environmental threat.' Assuming extensive multilateral negotiations are a
prerequisite to claiming an environmental measure is "necessary," it is unclear how
extensive attempts at negotiation must be before a party can act unilaterally. It is
arguable that for many types of pollution taxes, extensive multilateral negotiations
have already attempted to resolve many forms of environmental threats, 70 which
265. Schoenbaum, supra note 199, at 276; see also Dolphin-TunaII, supra note 17, 5.34-
.39; GATT Dispute Panel Report on Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991); Wisthoff-Ito,
supra note 20, at 275.
266. See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, IN 184-87 (finding that using an economic embargo
to require another WTO member to adopt essentially the same regulatory program as the
embargoing country violates the article XX chapeau test); Reformulated Gasoline, supra note
17, at 630-33 (same); Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17, at 898; Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17,
at 199-2d0.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 220-30.
268. Admittedly, this is still unilaterally coercive toward implementing the taxing nation's
standards.
269. Dolphin-Tuna , supra note 17, at 199-200.
270. Most types of airborne pollutants are already the subject of various environmental
treaties. See, e.g., Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for
signature Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,541,1302 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Mar. 16,
1983); Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1987); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 55. However, most
of these treaties do not have meaningful enforcement provisions. See Beardslee, supra note 94
at 384-92; see also Brotmann, supra note 5, at 345-46 (indicating the difficulties of enforcing
international treaties and the ambiguities of interpretation). Thus, the real question becomes
whether a nation must try to negotiate multilateral enforcement action before taking matters
into its own hands. To date, GATT/WTO panels have appeared to consider negotiation a
precondition for a unilateral action to be "necessary." See, e.g., Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17,
166-67; Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17, at 612 (summarizing WTO Dispute Panel
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when coupled with the less restrictive nature of a tax, might make it palatable as a
necessary restraint. However, given the GATT/WTO panel rhetoric to date, it seems
unlikely that the requirements of subparagraph (b) can be met, particularly since any
multilateral treaty obligations the United States could point to will tend to lack any
enforcement provision that the United States could claim to be acting under.27
Fortunately, things look much more promising under subparagraph (g) of article
XX. Subparagraph (g) permits GATr/WTO inconsistent measures that are related to
the conservation ofan exhaustible natural resource.272 Thus, for subparagraph (g), one
must determine whether the measure is related to conservation and whether an
exhaustible natural resource is conserved.
At one time, "relating to" was interpreted to mean "primarily aimed at."' 73
However, subsequent panel decisions have clarified that "relating to" means "having
a substantial relationship with." '274 Just as the regulations concerning gasoline
standards in Reformulated Gasoline were found to be related to conserving clean
air275 and the ban on shrimp from noncertified countries was found to be related to
conserving an endangered species in Shrimp-Turtle,276 it seems virtually certain that
a pollution tax would be related to conserving clean air and water. The only argument
that could be made against this is that since emissions taxes do not set a maximum
level of pollution that is acceptable, there is no way of knowing whether such
conservation will actually occur. 7 However, the success or failure of a regulatory
endeavor does not negate the goal it is attempting to achieve. After all, virtually every
air control standard set under the CAA was not met by its respective deadline,27 but
few would argue that the law was not related to conserving clean air.
The "relating to" standard also requires that the measure be "taken in conjunction
with domestic restrictions on the use of the resource." '279 In Reformulated Gasoline,
"in conjunction with" was interpreted to mean "together with" or "jointly with."2 0
The proposed tax satisfies this interpretation because it is applied to domestic and
foreign producers as part of the nation's environmental-law regime.
Finally, the "relating to" standard requires that the measure be "primarily aimed at
Report on United States-Standards forReformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/SD2/R
(Jan. 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 274, 296-98 (1996)); Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17, at 853, 896-
98; Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17, at 199-200.
271. See, e.g., supra note 157.
272. GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. XX(g).
273. Dolphin-Tuna 11, supra note 17, at 893.
274. See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 135-42; Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17,
at 621-23 (stating that the phrase "relating to" needs "to be read in context and in such a
manner as to give effect to the purposes and objects of the GeneralAgreement").
275. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17, at 623.
276. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 77 135-42; Rueda, supra note 20, at 659.
277. See supra Part II.B (discussing the limitations of emissions-discharge taxes as a
pollution-control device).
278. Cf. WILmIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 138 (2d ed. 1994).
279. Housman & Zaelke, supra note 211, at 550.
280. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17, at 624; see also Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17,
1 143-45.
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rendering the domestic restriction effective."2' This language has been interpreted
to mean that the measure affecting the foreign products must be in conjunction with
a like domestic measure thathas come into effect.' Since the proposed taxing regime
will come into application at the same time for both foreign and domestic goods, this
element of the "relating to" standard is also met. Overall, a recent panel has
summarized that the "relating to" requirement is met "if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic product or consumption,"283
which would be the case with the proposed emissions tax.
To pass the second prong of subparagraph (g), one must determine whether the
conservation is of an exhaustible natural resource. Although some nations have tried
to argue that "exhaustible natural resource" should be interpreted to mean
nonrenewable, nonliving matter (basically, minerals),28 recent panel reports have
clarified that clean air is an exhaustible natural resource285 and that under certain
conditions plants and animals may be exhaustible natural resources.28 Thus, a
pollution tax designed to help conserve clean air would conserve a natural resource,
and there can be little doubt that a tax intended to conserve clean water would receive
a similar analysis.28
281. Housman & Zaelke, supra note 211, at 550; Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at 276.
282. Wold, supra note 185, at 860-61.
283. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17, at 624.
284. For examples of commentary supporting this view, see Steve CharnovitzExploring the
Environmental Exceptions in GA77'Article XX, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1991, at 37; Steve
Chamovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATTRules and TheirApplication to Environmental
Trade Measures, 7 TVL ENvTL L.J. 299 (1994).
285. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17, at 612 (summarizing WTO Dispute Panel
Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/SD2/R
(Jan. 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 274, 299 (1996)).
286. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 127-34; Rueda, supra note 20, at 659.
287. An additional point deserves mention with regard to a nation's attempts to conserve a
natural resource under the article XX(g) exception. To date, the disputes dealing with attempts
to protect or conserve have been concerned with resources either within the sovereign
jurisdiction of the nation invoking the exemption or in what can clearly be called the global
commons, such as the world's oceans. Although one can argue that many forms of pollution,
given their migratory nature, are best understood as affecting the global commons as well as
the territories of multiple nations, the pollution tax proposed herein has clear effects on, and
is attempting to change conditions in, the business, economy, and environment of other
sovereign nations. This pollution tax potentially reaches beyond the realm of merely having
extraterritorial effects and arguably into the realm of interference with the sovereign right of
other nations to set their own environmental policies. Some commentators have argued that the
article XX(g) exception should be read as limited to conserving resources in the global
commons. See, e.g., Brotmann, supra note 5, at 341-42. Most of this commentary is based on
the language of Dolphin-Tuna I, which condemned the extraterritorial nature of the U.S. law,
even as applied to the global commons. See Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17, at 199-200.
However, this position was abandoned in Dolphin-Tuna I. See Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note
17, at 858-59; Rueda, supra note 20, at 654-56; Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at 277.
Furthermore, more recent cases have made clear that the article XX environmental exceptions
can be applied extraterritorially. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 133; see also Reformulated
Gasoline, supra note 17, at 628-30; Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 279. However, there is some
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Finally, to fall within an article XX exemption, a measure must meet the chapeau
test. The measure must not be applied in a manner that constitutes an arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination against countries where the same conditions prevail nor
in a manner that constitutes a disguised restriction on trade.'n Basically, like products
from similarly situated countries cannot be unjustifiably or arbitrarily discriminated
against 9 It is well established that such discrimination can exist either between
foreign products from two different countries or between domestic and foreign
products.' However, in applying the chapeau test, "like products" is not to be given
the same narrow reading as was applied to the term in determining whether another
article of GATT/WTO is violated; for to do so would effectively render the
exemptions in article XX moot.29' Thus, it appears that under article XX, products
made from different production methods can be considered not to be like products.2'
If this analysis is correct, a pollution discharge tax would clearly be exempt under
article XX(g). There is no discrimination between various foreign products or
between domestic and foreign products, because all products are subjected to the
same tax system.
The only potential claim of "unjustifiable discrimination" would be against the
imposition of a uniform tax rate on all countries without taling into account their
respective levels of development, which is itself a bizarre notion of discrimination by
equal treatment.293 However, this could be solved through graduated tax rates based
on the different levels ofnational development and national environmental regulation.
Any attempt to apply graduated tax rates, however, would need to be pursued with
the utmost care, for it opens the door to an almost certain GATT/WTO complaint that
two or more similarly situated countries are being treated differently; namely, that one
of them is being arbitrarily discriminated against.
support for the position that more recent GATF/WTO decisions have required nations to meet
a nexus standard with the resource to be conserved when invoking an exception. See Patricia
I. Hansen, Transparency, Standards ofReview, and the Use of Trade Measures to Protect the
Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1017 (1999). It is unclear what this standard would
require. The pollution tax, by protecting resources outside the global commons, would raise
extraterritoriality issues beyond those dealt with by GATT/WTO panels to date, but other
exceptions, such as article XX(e), which permits abrogation of GATr/WTO obligations with
regard to the products of prison labor, by their very terms have an extraterritorial effect on
actions within other sovereign jurisdictions. Thus there is currently no reason to presume the
article XX(g) exception would not extend to a pollution tax's effects in another nation.
288. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 156-62; Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17, at 895; see
also Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at 267, 279.
289. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, IN 160-75. In fact, this was the basis upon which the law
in controversy was held to violate GAT/WTO. Id.; see also Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at
267.
290. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 150; Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17, at 626-33.
291. See, e.g., Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 123-35.
292. See id. However, this position is not without critics. Some argued, particularly before
Shrimp-Turtle, that GA'IT/WTO prohibits discrimination against products that are otherwise
similar except for the way they were produced. See, e.g., Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at 277.
293. This argument is even more difficult to make in light of the article I requirement of
most-favored-nation treatment for all members of GATF/WTO. See GATr 1947, supra note
18, art. I.
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Furthermore, in nations, similar to the United States, where significant
environmental regulations have been in place for a substantial period, most industries
have already expended considerable sums on pollution-control devices. A foreign
country might argue that a fiat pollution tax is actually a disguised restriction on
trade' because it forces a foreign company that has few pollution controls in place
to expend more funds than a U.S. company to get to the same level of taxes per
product. However, since the U.S. company will be taxed on all its production and the
foreign companies will be taxed only on their goods imported into the United States,
the potential tax burden, and the relative incentive to install a given level ofpollution-
control devices, will be quite different and should provide a credible argument that
the pollution tax is not a disguised restriction on trade. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, a lower tax rate for nations with less advanced environmental laws, by
lowering even further the potential additional foreign tax burden due to the disparity
in the nature of environmental controls already in place, would further strengthen the
argument that the discharge tax is not a disguised restriction on trade.
Unfortunately, one of the latest environmental disputes handled by the WTO
showed considerable concern over the fact that the United States, in imposing a ban
on shrimp produced in a certain way, had acted unilaterally and had not adequately
negotiated with other nations.' 5 However, the reason for finding that an exception
under article XX(g) was not available was that the U.S. law arbitrarily discriminated
between similarly situated nations.' Thus the concern over unilateral action may
largely have been a matter arising under the facts of the case because of the nature of
the restriction. The law in dispute created an embargo, the type of restriction least
favored under the GATI/WTO, and the only way to avoid the ban was to adopt the
approach of the country imposing it. An embargo is highly coercive on other
nations,2' unlike a tax, which does not require a nation to modify its policies in order
to continue trading. Furthermore, various nations were being treated differently."'
Thus, the nature of the unilateral action affected whether arbitrary discrimination had
294. Such a disguised trade restriction would violate the chapeau test for an article XX
exception. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
295. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 167.
[I]t is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO Member to
use an economic embargo to require other members to adopt essentiallythe same
comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in
force within that Member's territory, without taking into consideration different
conditions which may occur in the territories of those other Members.
Id. 164 (emphasis in original). This language seems particularly disturbing considering there
were already multilateral conventions obligating nations to protect sea turtles. See CITES,
supra note 157; see also Brotmann, supra note 5, at 345-47 (indicating the difficulties of
enforcing international treaties and the ambiguities ofinterpretation); Chalifour, supra note 13,
at 591-92 (discussing various international conventions potentially protecting sea turtles);
Rueda, supra note 20, at 662 (same); Winter supra note 4, at 242 (same).
296. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 1172-75.
297. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 99161-64; see also Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at 278.
298. Certification depended upon whether a nation had signed other treaties and upon its
ability to show compliance with mandated U.S. technological standards for harvesting. See
Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 9 162-63.
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occurred. On the other hand, it is possible that the GATTWTO was again signaling
that unilateral measures affecting territories other than one's own are not acceptable.
This position is bolstered by other decisions that have also shown hostility to
unilateral environmental protections.2' However, there is nothing in a GATT/WTO
opinion that goes so far as to say that only multilateral actions are acceptable, and
several commentators have concluded that Shrimp-Turtle authorizes unilateral
extraterritorial process related sanctions.3" In fact, Shrimp-Turtle recognizes that if
multilateral action is required to create a legitimate exemption, the result would be
effectively to gut both articles XX and XXI.3 °0
C. Considering the Alternatives
Having considered a pollution tax as a means of modernizing U.S. environmental
law to obtain extraterritorial benefits for the global environment, it is worth briefly
examining alternative domestic environmental approaches to determine whether any
of them can potentially have a meaningful trausnational effect on the global
environment in a manner that is acceptable under GAT7/WTO.3 2
Based on traditional notions of sovereignty, the only nation with jurisdiction to
regulate the emissions of all the businesses located within a territory, whether through
design specifications for factories, mandated pollution-control technologies, or
mandatory participation in an emissions trading program, is the government of the
territory in which the businesses are located. 3 Similarly, one nation has no authority
to mandate a certain ambient air or water quality within the sovereign jurisdiction of
another nation.3 There are only two ways the United States could regulate a facility
located abroad without the cooperation of the foreign government where the facility
is located. First, under certain circumstances, U.S. law recognizes jurisdiction over
branches and subsidiaries of U.S. companies. 5 However, this jurisdictional reach
299. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 17, at 627-33; Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17, at
898; Dolphin Tuna I, supra note 17, at 199-200; see also Winter, supra note 4, at 242;
Wisthoff-Ito, supra note 20, at 279.
300. Rueda, supra note 20, at 667; Wofford, supra note 24, at 581.
301. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, I 155-60. Logically, the exceptions are set forth in order
for an individual nation to be able to invoke them since a multilateral action (a treaty) that is
later in time can effectively trump provisions of GATT/WTO that are earlier in time. Vienna
Convention, supra note 159, at 339; see also supra Part IV.
302. For a discussion of potential extraterritorial effects of emissions trading programs, see
infra Part II.C.2.
303. Dunoff, supra note 92, at 1423-26; see also Gardner, NationalSovereignty, supra note
82, at 570-71. Admittedly, certain other nations may have jurisdiction over a limited number
of businesses within another nation's territory, such as foreign branches or subsidiaries of
otherwise domestic companies, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 954 (1994) (taxation controlled foreign
corporations); id. § 902 (U.S. tax credit for taxes paid abroad by foreign subsidiaries); id. § 862
(definition of income and taxable income from outside the U.S.), but such jurisdiction is likely
limited to a small enough number of businesses and therefore represents little meaningful
potential for widespread extraterritorial environmental benefits.
304. Dunoff, supra note 92, at 1423-26; Gardner, National Sovereignty, supra note 82.
305. CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 165, § 4-6; Fowler, supra note 165, at 27-28; Gibney
& Emerick, supra note 165, at 137-38.
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would be unlikely to significantly effect the total pollution-control situation in any
given foreign country because most businesses in any given country will be
domestically owned. Second, the United States has jurisdiction to regulate products
produced by foreign facilities to the degree such products are brought into the United
States.3°6 Thus, the United States can require the product to meet domestic design
specifications or require it to utilize particular pollution-control technologies.
Provided it is also applied to like domestic products, such regulation is clearly
permitted by GATr/WTO. °7 Once again, however, this will have a very limited
effect. Although the goods entering the United States will be environmentally
friendly, other goods produced by the company (for other markets) need not comply
with any U.S. design specifications nor utilize particular pollution-control
technologies." 8 Furthermore, the factory producing the product can be as
environmentally unfriendly as the law where it is located permits. Attempts by a
jurisdiction to mandate environmentally friendlyproduction techniques for a product
as a condition to the product being imported have consistently been held to be a
violation of GATr article XI and to be outside the scope of the article XX(b) and (g)
exceptions.3" Thus, the command-and-control approach, with mandatory standards
to be met, would appear to have extremely limited possibilities for extraterritorial
environmental benefits under current notions of sovereignty and GATT/WTO
jurisprudence.
Another possible approach would be to eliminate environmental regulation in favor
of full disclosure by companies of their total pollution outputs. Under this approach,
the United States would require companies importing products into the United States
merely to disclose the amount of pollution used to produce the product or produced
by the company in total. This information could then be made available to the public
and to environmental groups in the hope that such consumer information would
mobilize consumers to pressure companies to be more environmentally friendly or fail
to do so at the risk of potentially losing the consumers' business. As noted above, the
United States has jurisdiction to require this information since the products are being
imported into the United States.3 As long as such a regulation was equally applied
to domestic manufacturers and was not a disguised restriction on trade, it would
appear to comply with GATT/WTO under the concept of national treatment for
imported products with regard to domestic laws and regulations, as set forth in article
III, although it could raise issues concerning the product-process distinction.3 ' The
306. CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 165, § 4-6.
307. GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. III, as amended by Protocol Modifying Part II and
Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14,1948,62 U.N.T.S. 80,
82; see also supra Part V.B.2.
308. A similar limitation would apply to deposit and refund schemes, since these would
apply only to those products imported into the United States.
309. See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 17, 184-87; Dolphin-Tuna II, supra note 17, at 890-
98; Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 17, at 197-201. However, the recent Shrimp-Turtle case
appears to take a less extreme approach to the product-process distinction and provides an
argument that a future process regulation might survive a GATF/WTO challenge. Shrimp-
Turtle, supra note 17, 156-59, 170-76.
310. CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 165, § 4-6.
311. The analysis is essentially the same as for an emissions tax, but without the potential
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regulation would also almost certainly fit within the article XX(g) and possibly (b)
exceptions."' Although this approach would be permissible, consumer activism
would likely provide only a limited incentive for companies to install pollution-
control technologies, in part because many consumers will purchase the cheapest
product, regardless of how environmentally unfriendly its production process may
have been, and in part because of the difficulty of adequately informing a large
enough consumer base.313 Coupling information disclosure with another regulatory
approach may provide additional, but limited, environmental benefits, both
domestically and abroad, beyond those provided by the other approach alone.
A final approach worth considering is granting environmental subsidies to
businesses in the United States and abroad to encourage them to install pollution-
control devices. Such an approach could greatly benefit the global environment,
particularly since pollution-control devices are exponentially expensive.3 4 For
whatever sum of money that the United States is willing to expend on reducing
pollution output, the global environment will get greater pollution reduction by
allocating that sum to a large number of factories around the globe for installation of
moderate pollution controls rather than using the funds so that U.S. factories have the
best available pollution-control technologies. Such a program should also be
GATT/WTO compliant, since environmental subsidies are generally permitted.3 5
However, such a program does nothing to create an incentive for dischargers to
reduce their emissions; that is, it does nothing to internalize the costs of pollution.
Companies may take the subsidies, but the benefits of the program will be limited to
the size of Uncle Sam's checkbook. Given the number of companies in the world,
such an undertaking seems overwhelming and financially massive. Where would the
money come from? Furthermore, the burden is potentially unending since such a
program creates no incentive for polluters to reduce pollution themselves. Like
information disclosure, a subsidy program has its benefits in helping protect the
planet but is probably best suited to being used in conjunction with another approach.
limitations caused by the BTA. See supra Part V.B.1-2. However, labeling potentially raises
special issues under the GATTIWTO rules on technical barriers to trade. This has become a
relatively controversial topic in recent years. For a more thorough analysis of the compatibility
ofeco-labeling with GATT/WTO, see Erik P. Bartenhagen, The Intersection of Trade and the
Environment: An Examination of the Impact ofthe TB TAgreement on Ecolabeling Programs,
17 ViR. ENVTL L.J. 51 (1997); Samuel N. Lind, Eco-Labels and International Trade Law:
Avoiding Trade Violations While Regulating the Environment, 8 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 113
(1996); Atsuko Okubo, Environmental Labeling Programs and the GATT/WTO Regime, I I
GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REv. 599 (1999); Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrier or Trade Boon? A
Critical Evaluation ofEnvironmental Labeling and Its Role in the "Greening'" of World Trade,
21 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 205 (1996).
312. See supra Part V.B.4.
313. Kimberly C. Cavanagh, It's a Lorax Kind of Market But Is It a Sneetches Kind of
Solution?: A CriticalReview of Current Laissez-Faire Environmental MarketingRegulation,
9 Vi.u ENVTL. L.J. 133, 206-10 (1998); Staffin, supra note 311, at 268-70.
314. KRIER& URSIN, supra note 171, at 25-26 (discussing the exponential costs associated
with pollution-control devices); Hanna, supra note 36, at 541 (stating that as environmental
regulation progresses, the compliance costs of polluters rise exponentially).
315. See infra Part V.E.
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D. Implementation Issues
What practical difficulties confront the implementation of an emissions tax?316 Are
these obstacles so daunting as to effectively render the proposal unworkable? At the
outset, it is worth remembering that unlike some other forms of regulation, a taxing
regime generates revenue."" So if costs associated with the implementation and
administration of a pollution tax are higher than those for the United States's current
command-and-control approach, some or all of this money could be used so that the
total drain on general government resources would be no greater than the present
approach. However, exorbitant costs do not seem likely.
318
Probably the most difficult aspect of a pollution tax is determining the proper level
of tax to give businesses a meaningful incentive to adopt appropriate environmental
protection technologies. 319 This difficulty would be further complicated if the tax
rates vary for different industries to account for the comparative difficulties some
industries may have in reducing certain pollutants and the potential burdens the tax
could place on such industries' abilities to remain commercially viable. Although
errors will initially be made in setting the appropriate tax rates, and as has been noted,
adjustments will have to occur periodically as total emissions diminish,320 such
determinations can be adjusted to correct for errors based on experience.
Furthermore, recent experience with existing emissions trading programs and current
emissions taxes in other countries can provide a guideline to assist in these
determinations.3 1' Additionally, this determination does not seem any more difficult
to resolve than the current difficulties presented by making the determinations
required under the CAA and the CWA"
Given concerns about the fact that a pollution tax does not inherently cap the total
level of pollution that will be produced and that this may lead to further degradation
of certain heavily contaminated areas, the tax regime could impose a surcharge rate
for pollution produced in the worst contamination basins of the United States.
Although such a surcharge imposes additional burdens on businesses located in such
areas, current command-and-control approaches similarly burden businesses in such
areas bymandating the use ofmore aggressive pollution-control technologies.3" Such
a surcharge would in no way affect foreign products, and thus would not create issues
under GATr/WTO, since GATI/WTO permits a nation to discriminate against
316. The concerns confronting implementation of a domestic emissions tax and their
potential solutions have been discussed at length. See generally, ROODMAN supra note 11;
Arnold, supra note 48; Colloquy, Pollution Tax Forum, 12 PACE ENVTL L. REv. I (1994);
Cole, supra note 129; Driesen, supra note 35; Nash, supra note 11; Stewart, ControllingRisks,
supra note 35; Stewart, Falling Paradigm, supra note 35; Symposium, supra note 27;
Tietenberg, supra note 35.
317. Worldwide use of pollution taxes could generate trillions of dollars annually.
ROODMAN, supra note 11, at 25, 156-68.
318. Id. at 169-83
319. Id. at 156-83.
320. See supra Part II.C.2.
321. ROODMAN, supra note 11, at 156-83; see also supra Part II.C.
322. ROODMAN, supra note 11, at 156-83; see also supra Part II.C.




However, as has been noted, if the regime contemplates different tax rates for
different nations based on their level of environmental regulation and general
development, the regime runs significant risks of being attacked under GATT/WTO
for treating similarly situated nations disparately."z Not only would differentiations
be an additional administrative burden, but also the burden is particularly onerous
given that any differentiations must be carefully considered and justified to avoid
violating GATT/WTO.
With regard to establishing the amount of tax to be paid, each business will have
to provide information regarding its level of pollution emissions and its production
levels. All businesses, both domestic and foreign, know their levels of production.
Determining pollution discharges presents little difficulty for U.S. businesses since
the current command-and-control approach already requires the vast majority of
industries to monitor their emission levels for the pollutants likely to be subject to the
tax.26 However, companies in many other countries may not currently be subjected
to monitoring requirements and technology may not be in place easily to perform
monitoring. Although these difficulties and costs associated with monitoring could
potentially discourage some manufacturers from exporting to the United States, the
costs of monitoring seem commercially bearable to U.S. businesses (since they
currently are doing so), so costs should not be particularly more burdensome to
foreign manufacturers. The potential loss of access to the world's largest single
nation market32 minimizes the concern over businesses choosing not to export to the
United States due to the extra difficulties associated with complying with a pollution
tax. However, the discharge tax regime may choose to spur the development of anew
industry abroad to monitor emissions of factories for purposes of calculating their
U.S. pollution taxes. In fact, to help avoid fraudulent reporting for tax calculation
purposes, the tax proposal may be improved by requiring independent third party or
government certification of every business's pollution and production output
Another issue worth considering is whether the tax should be applied only to the
pollution generated to produce the final product being imported or whether the
emissions totals should include discharges made in the creation of any component
parts.328 Clearly a tracing approach creates a more comprehensive tax and more
effectively internalizes the costs of the pollution generated. Furthermore, it eliminates
the possibility of emissions tax evasion through a segregated manufacturing process
324. U.S. Superfund, supra note 173, at 161.
325. See supra Part V.B.1, 4.
326. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2607 (1994). U.S. companies are
also preparing, apparently without concerns over costs or feasibility, to monitor additional
emissions in anticipation of additional regulations. Marion B. Allen, Climate Change:
Companies Developing Inventory System for Greenhouse Gases, Pew Center Says, 31 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 625 (Apr. 7, 2000).
327. Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 162, at 62-63.
328. These approaches can be generally compared to the import duty calculation applied to
some products under NAFTA, which-in determining the level of North American content in
a product--does not trace back the percentage in each component but rather evaluates each
component as either entirelyNorth American or not, and the approach for automobiles, which
traces back the percentage in components. NAFTA, supra note 113, at 349-57.
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that manufactures as many components as possible separately to minimize a
company's potential tax burden. However, unless the taxes will be extraordinarily
high, it seems likely that many companies can minimize their tax burdens more cost
effectively by installing pollution-control technologies rather than rearranging their
entire manufacturing processes?' Additionally, a tracing requirement would
significantly increase the burden upon manufacturers since they would need data
from all parts suppliers. However, if empirical data shows this risk to be significant,
or if many foreign companies already segregate manufacturing in this manner, a less
burdensome compromise would be to require tracing for all components
manufactured by the same company or corporate group.330 However, any form of
tracing creates additionalpotential problems with regard to whether the taxing regime
is GATT/WTO compliant by placing further emphasis on the product-process
distinction for each level that the discharge tax attempts to reach 3
Finally, since the principle behind the pollution tax is to internalize costs and create
an incentive for companies to utilize superior environmental protection technologies,
one must consider what should be done if the country where a product is produced
imposes a similar pollution tax on one or more of the pollutants emitted. Such double
taxation could be unduly burdensome for some companies, even though it would
incrbase the incentives to enhance a company's pollution controls. Thus it seems
appropriate to allow a tax credit that maybe applied against the U.S. tax on the same
pollutant equal to the amount of tax that has been paid on that pollutant abroad for
the same item. Such a tax credit presents no conceptual difficulties since a similar
approach is used currently in the United States to avoid double taxation on income.332
This tax credit effectively would allow each government to determine what it
considers to be the appropriate tax rate for a given pollutant, would tax the producer
at the higher rate for products exported from the country of production to the United
States, and would avoid creating a double taxation situation that could overly burden
businesses. Obviously, if other nations adopted pollution tax regimes like the one
proposed herein, the United States should negotiate double taxation tax relief for its
manufacturers exporting to such nations to the extent such nations do not
automatically grant it.
E. Use ofRevenues
Finally, what should be done with the revenues of a pollution tax? An emissions
tax is designed to produce environmental benefits by providing incentives to reduce
one's tax burden, regardless of how the revenues are expended. As such, the revenues
couldbe treated like any other general revenues generated by the government through
329. This seems likely since the tax burden on foreign manufacturers will be relatively
modest, creating incentives to install moderate pollution controls. Such a cost is unlikely to
warrant wholesale corporate reorganization.
330. Domestically, tracing is not generally an issue since companies are taxed on all their
discharges.
331. See supra Part V.B.
332. See generally JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: US TAXATION OF




its taxing regimes and used for anynormal government budgetary purpose. Such use
would in no way implicate GATT/WTO. Several nations have already taken such an
approach with regard to some of their more limited pollution tax regimes by using the
revenues to cover revenue losses created by personal tax reductions, essentially
shiftingthe tax base somewhat.3
Given that the main reason for establishing this tax regime is to better the global
environment, it seems appropriate to consider utilizing the proceeds to further combat
pollution problems. Three basic ways exist for which these tax revenues could be
used to further environmental protection efforts.3"
First, the revenues could be used to fund remediation activities for currently
contaminated areas. Since such government sponsored cleanups would not be aiding
a particular business in competing with other businesses, they would not be
considered subsidies and should not raise concerns under GAT/WTO. 35
Second, funds could be used for environmental technology research and
development. Such grants would be government subsidies subject to regulation under
GATT/WTO.336 Similarly, ifthe revenues of a pollution tax are provided to individual
companies to install enhanced pollution-control devices, such revenues constitute
subsidies and are subject to the GATT/WTO subsidy regulations.
The GATT/WTO approach to subsidies has been described as a stop-light
system. 37 There are red-light subsidies, yellow-light subsidies, and green-light
subsidies. Red-light subsidies are prohibited, green-light subsidies are permitted, and
yellow-light subsidies are permitted but may be actionable or be subject to
countervailing duties by other nations to offset the competitive advantage provided
by the subsidy.338 Export subsidies, such as grants or tax benefits tied directly to the
making of exports, and import substitution subsidies are red-light subsidies. 39 Subject
333. See WESTIN, supra note 16, at 25-42.
334. A thorough analysis of GATT/WTO compliance issues for various forms of
environmental grants and subsidies would require another article. However, a general
introduction to the likely compatibility of several environmental uses of the revenues derived
from an emissions tax is worth considering at this time.
335. Admittedly, given current U.S. liability standards for certain contaminated sites, one
could argue that the government payment ofremediation costs effectively saves the company
from expenses that it would otherwise have to undertake. Although this could be seen as a form
of subsidy, it will not cause injury to a foreign business, so it would not be an actionable
subsidy. See infra text accompanying notes 337-50.
336. Subsidies are regulated under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, Apr. 15,1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGALINSTRUMENTS-RESULTSOFTHE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/24-scm.pdf.
337. JEFFREY S. THOMAS & MICHAEL A. MEYER, THE NEW RULES OF GLOBAL TRADE: A
GUIDE TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 150-64 (1997); M. Jean Anderson & Gregory
Husisian, The Subsidies Agreement, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL
TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 299, 304
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996).
338. THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 337, at 150-64; Anderson & Husisian, supra note 337,
at 308-27.
339. THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 337, at 150-64; Anderson & Husisian, supra note 337,
at 309-12. For example, U.S. foreign-sales corporations haverecently been held to be an export
subsidy. WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
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to certain limits, government research and development grants and grants to help
industries install updated pollution-control technologies mandated by a new
regulatory regime are green-light subsidies.' Yellow-light subsidies are those
government grants, credits, or rebates that collaterallybenefit a domestic company in
competing with foreign producers, which may also benefit the company relative to
domestic competitors?"1 To be actionable, the yellow-light subsidy must confer a
benefit to the company, a standard that is almost always met. 2 The subsidy must also
be specific.4 3 To be specific, a subsidy must be limited to particular companies or
industries; a subsidy is not specific if it is part of a general government program
available to everyone. Finally, to be actionable, a yellow-light subsidy must undercut
the benefits derived from GATT/WTO tariff concessions. 3"
Government grants for the research and development of pollution-control
technologies, although subject to certain limitations, 5 would be considered green-
light subsidies and are permitted under GATT/WTO. Ordinarily, government grants
used to fund the installation of enhanced pollution-control devices are a green-light
subsidy, provided either that the devices are not mandated under a regulatory
regime.. or if mandated, the percentage of total cost limitations are met"47
Additionally, if such funds were used in a generally available government program
that makes such technology available to all entities so desiring it or to those entities
that meet a set of objective criteria, the subsidy would be nonactionable due to lack
of specificity," and also possibly because it does not undercut a tariff advantage
Corporations", WTIDS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000), 39 I.L.M. 717, 718 (2000). However,
rebates of domestic taxes on goods destined for export are not considered to be export subsidies
and do not violate GATT/WTO.
340. THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 337, at 150-64; Anderson & Husisian, supra note 337,
at 316-20. Technically, the green-light safe harbor for certain types of subsidies has expired.
However, it seems likely that it will be reinstated in the near future, so this Article will discuss
all three potential categories of subsidies. Until renewal occurs, all subsidies that would
otherwise be considered green light must be analyzed using the yellow-light standards.
341. THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 337, at 150-64; Anderson & Husisian, supra note 337,
at 312-16.
342. THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 337, at 150-64; Anderson & Husisian, supra note 337,
at 312-16. An example of a subsidy that would not confer a benefit would be a tax rebate for
a company that is not paying the type of taxes subject to the rebate.
343. THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 337, at 150-64; Anderson & Husisian, supra note 337,
at 312-16.
344. THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 337, at 150-64; Anderson & Husisian, supra note 337,
at 312-16. In other words, the subsidy cannot, in essence give the domestic company a financial
benefit that offsets the benefits a foreign company receives through GATI/WTO tariff
reductions, thereby placing the domestic company in a superior competitive position.
345. See THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 337, at 150-64; Anderson & Husisian, supra note
337, at 316-20.
346. This type of subsidy would be acceptable since it does not affect the competitiveness
of the business receiving the funds.
347. THOMAS &MEYER, supra note 337, at 150-64; Anderson & Husisian, supra note 337,
at 316-20.
348. Hyung-Jin Kim, Reflections on the Green Light Subsidyfor Environmental Purposes,
J. WORLD TRADE, June 1999, at 167, 172-73.
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provided under the GATT/WTO.
However, a subsidy granted on revenues derived from an emissions tax present a
rather unique problem. Since the tax regime is based on pollution output, any grant
allowing one company to lower its tax burden by installing superior technology
without paying the full cost of such technology effectively allows one company to
have a competitive advantage over other companies that have not received a similar
subsidy. Although the GATT/WTO has not specifically envisioned such an
environmental subsidy, it seems unlikely, given the fiscal advantages it confers under
an emissions tax, to remain within the green-light designation even if the numerical
limitations for environmental subsidies are maintained.
Logically, such a subsidy should be considered a yellow light subsidy. As a yellow-
light subsidy, if it were made generally available to all (or available to limited groups
based on objective criteria) it should survive GATTIWTO scrutiny for lack of
specificity. Alternatively, the subsidy could be made available only to companies
outside the United States. Under such an approach, the funds would be directed
where they could be of the most use, in installing devices that could provide
significant pollution-reduction gains at moderate cost rather than in installing cutting
edge technology to obtain even smaller domestic gains."' Although this approach
does not benefit a domestic competitor by undercutting the benefits to be obtained by
the GATT/WTO, such an approach would be subject to attack for unjustifiably
treating similarly situated foreign producers differently?'
A final approach wouldbe to make the revenues, or a consistent percentage thereof,
available to the parties that have paid the tax, in proportion to the amount paid, for
use in purchasing and installing pollution-control devices. Like the prior proposal,
this approach would put a large percentage of the funds where it can do the most
good."' It should also be permissible by failing to be specific since it is administered
pursuant to objective criteria. This approach also makes it far harder for foreign
businesses to argue that the benefits of the GATTIWTO are undercut by the subsidy
since every one, even foreigners, receives a comparable benefit. Likewise, it does not
treat similarly situated producers disparately; everyone is treated the same. Finally,
the subsidy would reduce hostility to the pollution tax program by putting the funds
back in the hands of those paying the tax and by effectively reducing their tax burden
in subsequent years.
VI. CONCLUSION
Is a pollution tax the way U.S. environmental law should be modernized? Although
it provides many of the market driven incentive benefits some commentators are
currently calling for in the next generation of environmental law, most of these
commentators ultimately favor an emissions trading regime. However, a properly
structured emissions tax could have a surprising additional benefit most
commentators have not considered: the ability to have extraterritorial effect and to
protect the global commons.
349. See supra Part V.A.
350. See supra Part V.B.2, 4.
351. See supra Part V.A.
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In an era of global industrialization and pollution, much of which is migratory, and
of weak and largely unenforceable international law, the air we breathe and the water
we drink are at considerable risk. Nations appear to be moving toward better
international environmental control mechanisms, but the pace is glacial while the
needs are pressing. Furthermore, too many nations continue to ignore the needs of the
environment in favor of increased economic development and expansion. Thus, the
needs of the environment demand more than international law can presently deliver.
A domestic per unit of production pollution tax appears to be an excellent short-
term solution. By taxing all products sold within its borders based on the amount of
pollution emitted during their production, the United States, as the world's largest
single market, can not only move its domestic environmental law to the next level,
that of market-based-incentive approaches, but also help improve the global
environment by giving polluters in other nations an incentive to install pollution-
control devices to lessen their tax burdens. Needless to say, if other nations follow
suit with similar programs, the incentive will become that much more powerful. In
any event, industries unconcerned with the environmental needs of the planet will no
longer be able to hide behind the sovereignty of nations that do not care about the
environment.
The only question that remains is whether such a course of action is permissible for
the United States to take. As a restriction on free trade, such a tax must be examined
in light of the obligations of trade agreements, the most important of which is the
GATT/WTO. Although it is likely, but not certain, that the tax violates the general
obligations of GATT/WTO, it appears to fall within the article XX(g) exception, as
it has been described in GAIT/WTO jurisprudence. As such, it appears to be a
workable solution to help protect the global environment today while diplomats work
toward more complete and multilateral solutions for tomorrow. As an added benefit,
the tax revenues could be used to further promote environmental cleanups or the
installation of additional pollution-control devices.
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